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COVID-19 AGGREGATE LITIGATION:
THE SEARCH FOR THE UPSTREAM
WRONGDOER
Robert H. Klonoff*
The COVID-19 pandemic has generated many suits—including thousands
of class actions—in which plaintiffs claim that defendants caused economic
or health-related harm. Although the COVID-19 context may have led many
plaintiffs’ lawyers to believe that the cases would be received with great
sympathy, courts thus far have been very cautious, focusing closely—as they
do in non-COVID cases—on whether the defendant has breached clear
contractual commitments or has engaged in tortious or other wrongdoing. If
anything, courts have been more skeptical and cautious in the COVID-19
context, recognizing that everyone has suffered due to the pandemic and that,
in many instances, defendants themselves have attempted in good faith to
navigate the challenges raised by the pandemic.
This Essay focuses primarily on three categories of cases that have already
generated numerous rulings: (1) business interruption insurance claims,
(2) tuition reimbursement actions, and (3) suits against prisons and
immigration detention facilities. These three categories of cases line up on
a continuum based on whether the proximate cause of the harm is COVID-19
itself or the conduct of the defendants. At one end are the business
interruption insurance cases, which have received hostile treatment from
almost all courts that have considered those claims. The underlying
insurance policies almost universally require “physical loss or damage” to
property, a requirement that is hard to square with losses caused by a
pandemic. In the middle are the tuition refund cases, which have seen mixed
success, with many (but not all) courts granting motions to dismiss after
failing to find that there was a contractual commitment to in-person teaching.
At the other end is the category of cases raising health and safety issues
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related to COVID-19 in prisons and at immigration detention facilities. On
the merits, this is the strongest of the three categories, given the clear legal
duty of government officials to protect the health of those in their custody.
Yet, even in this context, many courts have declined to authorize injunctive
relief, finding that the officials involved have attempted in good faith to
protect their populations from COVID-19. At bottom, courts have
commendably stayed focused on the merits and have not been swayed by the
enormity of COVID-19 or the large numbers of claims. After discussing the
three categories above, this Essay also briefly examines (1) consumer, labor,
and securities fraud cases in the context of COVID-19; (2) COVID-19 cases
involving arbitration clauses and class action waivers; and (3) the handful
of class-wide settlements that have thus far been reached in COVID-related
litigation.
INTRODUCTION.................................................................................. 387
I. COVID-19 LITIGATION IN THE THREE SELECTED CATEGORIES .. 391
A. Business Interruption Insurance Cases ............................ 391
1. Rulings on Motions to Dismiss .................................. 392
2. Rulings on Aggregation ............................................. 395
a. Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation ............ 395
b. Class Certification Rulings .................................. 396
B. Tuition Refund Cases ........................................................ 397
1. Rulings on Motions to Dismiss .................................. 399
2. Class Certification Rulings ........................................ 403
C. Prison and Immigration Detention Cases ........................ 405
1. Class Certification ...................................................... 406
2. Merits Rulings............................................................ 410
II. OTHER EXAMPLES OF THE IMPORTANCE OF FOCUSING ON THE
DEFENDANT’S CONDUCT ....................................................... 418
A. Consumer Claims ............................................................. 418
B. Labor Cases ...................................................................... 420
C. Securities Fraud Cases..................................................... 421
III. OTHER IMPORTANT TRENDS IN COVID-19 CASES .................... 423
A. Arbitration Clauses .......................................................... 423
B. Willingness of Some Defendants to Reach Prompt
Class-Wide Settlements................................................... 424
CONCLUSION ..................................................................................... 427

2022]

COVID-19 AGGREGATE LITIGATION

387

INTRODUCTION
No one could have predicted that, in early 2020, a pandemic would change
the face of the planet. In addition to causing massive numbers of deaths and
other serious injuries, the COVID-19 pandemic has had devastating
economic consequences for millions of people in the United States and
throughout the world. Just focusing on the United States, as of August 31,
2022, the number of deaths from COVID-19 totaled over 1,040,0001—far
exceeding the total number of American deaths from the 1918 Spanish flu
pandemic.2 As compared to 1918, however, today’s Americans are far more
litigious—whereas the Spanish flu pandemic led to very few suits,3
COVID-19 has resulted in thousands of suits in the United States alone,
including over a thousand class actions.4 These include, among other
categories:
• business interruption insurance claims;
• claims against colleges and universities seeking tuition refunds for
switching from in-person to online classes;
• claims seeking refunds for canceled travel plans, canceled
entertainment events, and gym closures;
• class actions against prisons and immigration detention facilities
for COVID-19 health risks to confined populations;
• various labor and employment claims related to COVID-19;
• consumer-related claims, such as price gouging; and
• securities fraud suits alleging false claims of a vaccine or cure, or
false statements regarding the financial impact of COVID-19.5
As suits started to mount, press accounts described the threat to defendants
as historic, on par with some of the largest and most contentious civil
litigation in history. One source, for example, stated that COVID-related
business interruption insurance litigation alone has “dwarf[ed]” prior
1. See COVID Data Tracker, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION (Aug. 31,
2022, 4:35 PM), http://web.archive.org/web/20220831235848/https://covid.cdc.gov/coviddata-tracker/#datatracker-home.
2. See Carla K. Johnson, COVID Has Killed About as Many Americans as the 1918–19
Flu, AP NEWS (Sept. 20, 2021), https://apnews.com/article/science-health-pandemics-unitedstates-coronavirus-pandemic-c15d5c6dd7ece88d0832993f11279fbb [https://perma.cc/8W98QQ8P] (noting that approximately 675,000 Americans died as a result of the 1918 Spanish
flu).
3. See Mark Jensen, The 1918 Flu Pandemic and High Court Jurisprudence, LAW360
(Mar. 27, 2020, 3:16 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/1257426/the-1918-flupandemic-and-high-court-jurisprudence [https://perma.cc/B7PK-C5FV] (noting that only five
suits were filed involving the 1918 pandemic).
4. See COVID-19 Labor & Employment Litigation Tracker: March 2020–March 2022,
LITTLER MENDELSON, https://www.littler.com/publication-press/publication/covid-19-laboremployment-litigation-tracker [https://perma.cc/Q3C9-DAS6] (Apr. 1, 2022) (identifying
5,659 suits and 646 class actions filed against employers due to labor and employment
violations related to coronavirus); Class Action Litigation Related to COVID-19: Filed and
Anticipated Cases in 2020, PIERCE ATWOOD (Mar. 9, 2021), https://www.pierceatwood.com/
alerts/class-action-litigation-related-covid-19-filed-and-anticipated-cases-2020
[https://perma.cc/8BN9-36RB] (summarizing more than 1,400 class actions filed in 2020).
5. See, e.g., PIERCE ATWOOD, supra note 4.
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“battlefields” such as asbestos, environmental pollution, and the September
11, 2001, terrorist attacks.6 According to that source, “there truly has never
been a fight of this scale.”7 Another source said that “the wave of
[COVID-related] lawsuits is unprecedented”—a “tsunami”—and noted that
COVID-19 “is expected to lead to more litigation than any other incident in
U.S. history.”8 Plaintiff-side class action firms—including some of the most
well-recognized firms in the country—have filed a myriad of COVID-related
class actions.9 And top defense-side law firms have geared up to represent
defendants in such cases, touting their expertise10 and warning that
“COVID-19 class actions [have] steadily proliferated across industries,
jurisdictions, and areas of law,” and are “reverberat[ing] throughout all
sectors and regions of the country.”11 COVID-related litigation is so
widespread that several websites have been established to track and count the
ever-changing landscape of the litigation, often broken down into multiple
categories of cases.12
6. Ashley Cullins, A New Year’s Nightmare: COVID-19 Litigation Piling Up,
HOLLYWOOD REP. (Jan. 11, 2021, 6:45 AM), https://www.hollywoodreporter.com/
business/business-news/a-new-years-nightmare-covid-19-litigation-piling-up-4112050/
[https://perma.cc/J6HZ-2MSE]; see also Leslie Scism, Covid-19 Insurance Lawsuits Move
Toward High-Stakes Phase, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 16, 2021, 5:30 AM), https://www.wsj.com/
articles/covid-19-insurance-lawsuits-move-toward-high-stakes-phase-11637058600
[https://perma.cc/4WSU-STKR] (“Covid-19 business interruption lawsuits have shaped up to
be one of the biggest fights the insurance industry has ever waged with policyholders.”).
7. Cullins, supra note 6.
8. Daniel S. Wittenberg, Brace for the Storm: The Tsunami of Pandemic-Related
Litigation, AM. BAR ASS’N (June 2, 2021), https://www.americanbar.org/groups/litigation/
publications/litigation-news/business-litigation/brace-the-storm-tsunami-pandemic-relatedlitigation/ [https://perma.cc/S8M2-SRM9]; see Esquire Deposition Sols., LLC, Scanning the
COVID-19 Litigation Scene, JD SUPRA (Aug. 18, 2020), https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/
scanning-the-covid-19-litigation-scene-68159/ [https://perma.cc/8JYJ-VUSM].
9. See,
e.g.,
COVID-19
Legal
Resource
Center,
COHEN MILSTEIN,
http://web.archive.org/web/20211102161132/https://www.cohenmilstein.com/covid-19legal-resource-center (Sept. 24, 2022) (focusing on Cohen Milstein’s expertise in
COVID-related cases in employment, business interruption, consumer, and other categories);
BERGER MONTAGUE, https://bergermontague.com/?s=covid [https://perma.cc/M5HG-FMW8]
(last visited Oct. 7, 2022) (listing various COVID-related class actions filed by Berger
Montague).
10. See, e.g., Molly Moriarty Lane, Scott T. Schutte, Sujal J. Shah, Noah J. Kaufman,
Gerald P. Konkel, W. Brad Nes, Robert M. Brochin & Peter C. Neger, Colleges and
Universities: Litigation Challenges and Risk Mitigation in the Face of COVID-19, MORGAN
LEWIS (May 21, 2020), https://www.morganlewis.com/pubs/2020/05/colleges-anduniversities-litigation-challenges-and-risk-mitigation-in-the-face-of-covid-19-cv19-lf
[https://perma.cc/T94B-A2KY] (Morgan Lewis touting its “multidisciplinary Coronavirus
COVID-19 Task Force to help guide [clients] through the broad scope of legal issues brought
on by this public health challenge”); Coronavirus Resource Center, DLA PIPER,
https://www.dlapiper.com/en/us/services/coronavirus-covid-19/
[https://perma.cc/JJ7EES2S] (last visited Oct. 7, 2022); COVID-19/Vaccine Resource Center, FISHER PHILLIPS,
https://www.fisherphillips.com/services/emerging-issues/covid_19-resource-center/index.
html?tab=overview [https://perma.cc/JX3T-LU9N] (last visited Oct. 7, 2022) (describing
COVID-19 task force focused on addressing issues facing employers due to the pandemic).
11. PIERCE ATWOOD, supra note 4.
12. See, e.g., id.; LITTLER MENDELSON, supra note 4; Rachel Bailey, An Updated Analysis
of Litigation Caused by COVID-19, LEX MACHINA (Oct. 6, 2020), https://lexmachina.com/
blog/an-updated-analysis-of-litigation-caused-by-covid-19/ [https://perma.cc/ZB76-VCAW].
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COVID-19 cases, of course, are a recent phenomenon. The first reported
instance of COVID-19 in the United States occurred in January 2020,13 and
the World Health Organization did not declare COVID-19 a global pandemic
until March 2020.14 Thus, many of the COVID-related suits have not
advanced significantly, if at all. Nonetheless, there has been a surprising
number of important rulings in various categories of cases. It is thus a good
time to take stock of the current status of COVID-19 litigation.
At first blush, one might expect that the difficult circumstances suffered
by plaintiffs in COVID-related cases—including serious health and
economic consequences—would create a favorable and highly sympathetic
climate for plaintiffs. Indeed, given the thousands of class actions that have
been filed in the wake of COVID-19, many plaintiffs’ attorneys apparently
believe that these cases are strong and eminently winnable, as well as suitable
for aggregate treatment. However, as developed below, plaintiffs’ success
thus far has been mixed at best. Courts addressing COVID-19 litigation have
done what they always do in analyzing civil suits—focus rigorously and
carefully on the “upstream” conduct of the defendant.15 Do plaintiffs
sufficiently allege that the defendant breached the precise terms of a contract
or engaged in tortious or other wrongdoing? Or is the real culprit COVID-19
itself? If anything, plaintiffs’ unimpressive track record thus far, and the
courts’ harsh criticism of plaintiffs’ theories and claims, suggest that courts
are being even more demanding of plaintiffs in COVID-19 cases than in
non-COVID civil suits. This approach reflects the reality that COVID-19
has impacted everyone, including the defendants. Indeed, the courts are
especially sensitive to the challenges caused by COVID-19, given their own
difficult issues in administering justice during a pandemic.16
It is beyond the scope of this Essay to address the case law relating to all
of the myriad categories of COVID-19 cases. Rather, Part I of this Essay
focuses on three major categories of COVID-related class actions:
(1) business interruption insurance cases, (2) tuition reimbursement actions,
and (3) suits against prisons and immigration detention centers alleging the
failure of authorities to protect their populations from COVID-19. Part I
focuses both on merits rulings and on procedural decisions granting or
denying aggregate treatment. This Essay examines business insurance
interruption cases and tuition reimbursement cases because of the sheer
13. See First Travel-Related Case of 2019 Novel Coronavirus Detected in United States,
CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION (Jan. 21, 2020), https://www.cdc.gov/media/
releases/2020/p0121-novel-coronavirus-travel-case.html [https://perma.cc/HF9D-BN9E].
14. See Domenico Cucinotta & Maurizio Vanelli, WHO Declares COVID-19 a Pandemic,
ACTA BIOMEDICA, Mar. 2020, at 157, 157.
15. See Samuel Issacharoff, Class Action Conflicts, 30 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 805, 831–32
(1997) (using the “upstream” and “downstream” terminology); see also PRINCIPLES OF THE L.
OF AGGREGATE LITIG. § 2.01 cmt. c (AM. L. INST. 2010) (referring to “‘upstream’ matters
focused on a generally applicable course of conduct on the part of those opposing the claimants
in the litigation”).
16. See, e.g., Helen Hershkoff & Arthur R. Miller, Courts and Civil Justice in the Time of
COVID: Emerging Trends and Questions to Ask, 23 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 321,
421–22 (2021).
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number of such cases17 and because courts in those cases have already issued
numerous rulings on motions to dismiss. It focuses on the prison and
immigration detention cases because, (1) as with the insurance and tuition
cases, courts have already issued numerous rulings and (2) those cases focus
on structural relief and thus provide a useful contrast to the first two
categories, which focus on economic damages.
These three categories of cases line up on a continuum based on the duties
that the defendants allegedly owe the plaintiffs. At one end, the business
interruption insurance cases have consistently received hostile treatment
from most courts because the contractual language of the policies cannot
fairly be read to insure against a pandemic.18 Courts have repeatedly found
that the defendant companies acted appropriately in denying coverage, given
that the only duty owed by insurers is to pay under the precise terms of the
policy.
In the middle, the tuition refund cases have seen, at best, mixed success,
with several, but not all, courts dismissing the cases on the pleadings after
failing to find any contractual commitment to in-person teaching in the event
of a pandemic.19 Schools have a duty to ensure the health of their students,
but that often requires dismissing students because of health or safety risks,
rather than maintaining in-person teaching in the face of clear dangers.
At the other end, the prison and immigration detention cases are the
strongest of the three categories, given the clear legal duty of public
institutions to protect the health of those in their custody in circumstances in
which release may not be a viable option.20 Yet, even in this context,
numerous courts have declined to authorize injunctive relief, finding that the
institutions’ officials have attempted in good faith to protect their populations
from COVID-19. In short, courts are doing what they are supposed to do:
evaluating the merits without being swayed by the sympathetic
circumstances of COVID-19 losses or the sheer number of cases.21
Although the primary focus of this Essay is on the three categories
discussed above, Part II looks briefly at other categories of COVID-19
cases—consumer, labor and employment, and securities fraud cases. There
are fewer rulings thus far in these categories, but it is already clear that the
success of those plaintiffs will likewise turn on whether, under the particular
17. See, e.g., Julianna Thomas McCabe, COVID-19 Class Actions Update, CARLTON
FIELDS (Dec. 15, 2020), https://www.carltonfields.com/insights/expect-focus/2020/covid19class-actions-update [https://perma.cc/2EA3-53P7] (noting that business interruption
insurance and tuition reimbursement represent 25 percent and 22 percent of all COVID-related
class actions, respectively); Covid Coverage Litigation Tracker, UNIV. PA. CAREY L. SCH.,
https://cclt.law.upenn.edu [https://perma.cc/XKY6-8LPR] (last visited Oct. 7, 2022) (noting
that between March 2020 and July 2022, over 2,300 business interruption insurance cases
were filed).
18. See infra Part I.A.
19. See infra Part I.B.
20. See infra Part I.C.
21. Cf. Richard A. Nagareda, The Preexistence Principle and the Structure of the Class
Action, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 149, 181 (2003) (“[T]he class action has no roving authority to
alter unilaterally class members’ preexisting bundle of rights . . . .”).
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facts, they can show clear contractual breaches or wrongful conduct by the
defendant. Part III examines cases involving arbitration clauses and class
action waivers. It concludes that, as in non-COVID cases, courts have
rigorously enforced such agreements. Part III also discusses the relatively
few class-wide settlements that have been reached thus far in COVID-19
cases. The paucity of such settlements suggests that most defendants are
mounting vigorous defenses and are not rushing to reach a compromise.
I. COVID-19 LITIGATION IN THE THREE SELECTED CATEGORIES
A. Business Interruption Insurance Cases
According to one source, business interruption insurance cases represent
approximately 25 percent of all COVID-related class actions.22 The
underlying insurance policies are designed to provide covered business
entities with a source of income when such parties are forced to temporarily
close or significantly cut back operations after sustaining a covered loss.23
Plaintiffs in these cases seek insurance coverage based on contract provisions
that typically require a “direct physical loss or damage to property,”
something that would not seem to contemplate losses caused by a
pandemic.24 Moreover, in some of the cases, policyholders have sued despite
being insured under policies that expressly exclude losses “caused by or
resulting from any virus.”25 It is not surprising that the vast majority of courts
that have ruled on motions to dismiss have held, without even reaching the
issue of class certification, that the loss of use of property stemming from
COVID-19 does not constitute a physical alteration to property.26 Of the few
courts that have taken up class certification, only one has certified a class
outside of the settlement context, and that certification ruling was overruled
on interlocutory appeal.27 There have been several motions requesting the
U.S. Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation (JPML) to centralize business
22. See McCabe, supra note 17.
23. See,
e.g.,
Business
Interruption
Insurance,
THE
HARTFORD,
https://www.thehartford.com/business-insurance/business-interruption-insurance
[https://perma.cc/9JGQ-CLGE] (last visited Oct. 7, 2022) (providing a description of business
interruption insurance, noting that such insurance “can help replace income you lose if you
can’t open temporarily after a covered loss, like property damage”); see also Sandy Point
Dental, P.C. v. Cincinnati Ins. Co., 20 F.4th 327, 329 (7th Cir. 2021) (noting that the policies
at issue “provided coverage for income losses sustained as a result of an action of civil
authority prohibiting access to covered property, when such action was taken in response to
‘direct physical loss’ suffered by other property”).
24. See, e.g., Mudpie, Inc. v. Travelers Cas. Ins. Co. of Am., 15 F.4th 885, 888 (9th Cir.
2021) (emphasis added).
25. See, e.g., Chung v. Am. Zurich Ins. Co., No. 20-CV-5555, 2021 WL 6136206, at *6
(E.D.N.Y. Dec. 29, 2021) (dismissing business interruption claims and stating that “[e]ven if
definitional ambiguity did exist, the Policy’s Virus Exclusion would apply so as to exclude
coverage” from any COVID-related claims).
26. See infra Part I.A.1.
27. See Elegant Massage, LLC v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., No. 20-cv-265, 2021
WL 3686668, at *11 (E.D. Va. Aug. 19, 2021), rev’d and remanded, No. 21-255, 2021 WL
4202678 (4th Cir. Sept. 2, 2021).
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interruption insurance cases for efficiency purposes under 28 U.S.C. § 1407,
but most such requests have been denied.28
This section first considers merits rulings in business interruption
insurance cases. It then discusses aggregation rulings, i.e., centralization
rulings by the JPML and the one ruling (reversed on appeal) granting class
certification.
1. Rulings on Motions to Dismiss
Defendants have prevailed in the vast majority of business interruption
insurance cases that have reached the motion to dismiss stage. Even more
strikingly, every federal circuit to address the issue (the U.S. Courts of
Appeals for the Second,29 Fourth,30 Fifth,31 Sixth,32 Seventh,33 Eighth,34
Ninth,35 Tenth36 and Eleventh37 Circuits) has sided with the defendants.
Notwithstanding the tragic economic losses suffered by many of the named
plaintiffs and putative class members, and notwithstanding the principle that
ambiguities in insurance contracts must be construed in favor of the
insured,38 these courts have consistently ruled in favor of the insurance
companies.
For instance, in Mudpie, Inc. v. Travelers Casualty Insurance Co. of
America,39 the Ninth Circuit unanimously affirmed the district court’s
dismissal of business interruption insurance claims brought by plaintiff, the
owner of a children’s store, for itself and a putative class based on business
interruption insurance coverage from Travelers.40 The Ninth Circuit had no
difficulty rejecting plaintiff’s argument that the policy language covering
“‘direct physical loss of or damage to’ property” could not be stretched to

28. See infra Part I.A.2.a.
29. See 10012 Holdings, Inc. v. Sentinel Ins. Co., Ltd., 21 F.4th 216, 219–22 (2d Cir.
2021) (non-class case).
30. See Uncork & Create LLC v. Cincinnati Ins. Co., 27 F.4th 926, 933–34 (4th Cir.
2022).
31. See Terry Black’s Barbecue, L.L.C. v. State Auto. Mut. Ins. Co., 22 F.4th 450,
454–56 (5th Cir. 2022) (non-class case).
32. See Estes v. Cincinnati Ins. Co., 23 F.4th 695, 699–702 (6th Cir. 2022) (non-class
case); In re Zurich Am. Ins. Co., No. 21-0302, 2021 WL 4473398, at *1 (6th Cir. Sept. 29,
2021).
33. See Sandy Point Dental, P.C. v. Cincinnati Ins. Co., 20 F.4th 327, 332–33 (7th Cir.
2021) (non-class case).
34. See Robert Levy, D.M.D., LLC v. Hartford Cas. Ins. Co., No. 21-1446, 2022 WL
2520570, at *1 (8th Cir. July 7, 2022).
35. See Mudpie, Inc. v. Travelers Cas. Ins. Co., 15 F.4th 885, 890–93 (9th Cir. 2021);
Levy Ad Grp., Inc. v. Fed. Ins. Co., No. 21-15413, 2022 WL 816927, at *1 (9th Cir. Mar. 17,
2022) (non-class case applying Nevada state law).
36. See Goodwill Indus. of Cent. Okla., Inc. v. Phila. Indem. Ins. Co., 21 F.4th 704,
708–13 (10th Cir. 2021) (non-class case), cert. denied, 142 S. Ct. 2779 (2022) (mem.).
37. See Gilreath Fam. & Cosm. Dentistry, Inc. v. Cincinnati Ins. Co., No. 21-11046, 2021
WL 3870697, at *2 (11th Cir. Aug. 31, 2021).
38. See, e.g., Buczek v. Cont’l Cas. Ins. Co., 378 F.3d 284, 288–89 (3d Cir. 2004).
39. 15 F.4th 885 (9th Cir. 2021).
40. Id. at 885.
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cover losses stemming from COVID-19.41 The court cited and quoted
numerous decisions supporting its conclusion, including an Eighth Circuit
decision in a non-class case.42 In addition, the Mudpie court relied on
language in the Travelers policies providing that the company would not “pay
for loss or damage caused by or resulting from any virus, bacterium or other
microorganism that induces or is capable of inducing physical distress,
illness or disease.”43 According to the court, “Mudpie does not plausibly
allege that ‘the efficient cause,’ i.e., the one that set others in motion, was
anything other than the spread of the [COVID-19] virus throughout
California, or that the virus was merely a remote cause of its losses.”44
The Ninth Circuit also rejected business interruption insurance claims in
two unpublished opinions handed down the same day as Mudpie.45 In one
of those cases, the court looked at the governing laws of the ten states at issue,
finding nothing in any of those laws that would salvage the claims.46
Similarly, in In re Zurich American Insurance Co.,47 the Sixth Circuit held,
in the context of more than a dozen restaurant operators seeking coverage for
lost income, that “‘a pandemic-triggered government order, barring in-person
dining at a restaurant’ does not qualify as ‘direct physical loss of or damage
to the property’ under Ohio law.”48 The court reaffirmed its prior holding,
rendered only a few days earlier, in a case involving a single restaurant.49 In
the earlier case, the court explained the fatal flaw with the plaintiff’s
argument:
Whether one sticks with the terms themselves (a “direct physical loss of”
property) or a thesaurus-rich paraphrase of them (an “immediate”
“tangible” “deprivation” of property), the conclusion is the same. The
policy does not cover this loss. The restaurant has not been tangibly
destroyed, whether in part or in full. And the owner has not been tangibly
or concretely deprived of any of it. It still owns the restaurant and
everything inside the space. And it can still put every square foot of the
premises to use, even if not for in-person dining use.50

41. Id. at 890.
42. Id. (discussing Oral Surgeons, P.C. v. Cincinnati Insurance Co., 2 F.4th 1141 (8th
Cir. 2021), and other cases).
43. Id. at 893.
44. Id. at 894 (quoting Sabella v. Wisler, 377 P.2d 889, 895 (Cal. 1963)).
45. See Chattanooga Pro. Baseball LLC v. Nat’l Cas. Co., No. 20-17422, 2021 WL
4493920, at *1 (9th Cir. Oct. 1, 2021); Selane Prods., Inc. v. Cont’l Cas. Co., No. 21-55123,
2021 WL 4496471, at *1 (9th Cir. Oct. 1, 2021).
46. See Chattanooga Pro. Baseball LLC, 2021 WL 4493920, at *1–3.
47. No. 21-0302, 2021 WL 4473398 (6th Cir. Sept. 29, 2021).
48. Id. at *1 (quoting Santo’s Italian Café LLC v. Acuity Ins. Co., 15 F.4th 398, 401 (6th
Cir. 2021)).
49. See Santo’s Italian Café LLC v. Acuity Ins. Co., 15 F.4th 398, 400 (6th Cir. 2021).
50. Id. at 401; accord Bridal Expressions LLC v. Owners Ins. Co., No. 21-3381, 2021 WL
5575753, at *2 (6th Cir. Nov. 30, 2021) (rejecting business interruption insurance loss claim
by a bridal shop on behalf of a putative class, stating that “[w]hat was true for the restaurant
in Santo’s Italian Café is true for the bridal shop today”—the court rejected plaintiff’s effort
to plead around the earlier precedent by alleging that COVID-19 was in fact present on the
property).
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Likewise, in Gilreath Family & Cosmetic Dentistry, Inc. v. Cincinnati
Insurance Co.,51 the Eleventh Circuit rejected a putative class’s claim that it
was entitled to business interruption insurance coverage for loss of business
to its dentistry operations stemming from COVID-19.52 In finding that there
was no “direct physical loss or damage” as required by the policy, the court
noted derisively that plaintiff “has alleged nothing that could qualify, to a
layman or anyone else, as physical loss or damage.”53
Similarly, in Goodwill Industries of Central Oklahoma, Inc. v.
Philadelphia Indemnity Insurance Co.,54 the Tenth Circuit found that the
contract “covered only losses stemming from physical alteration or tangible
dispossession of property,” and that “[n]either occurred here.”55 The court
noted that “the decisions of every other circuit” to decide the issue were in
accord.56 It further found, as an independent matter, that the contract’s virus
exclusion barred the claim.57
Although courts in these cases understand the serious losses suffered by
plaintiffs, they also understand their duty to adhere to the plain language of
the insurance policies. As one district court explained in a suit brought as an
individual action:
The Court understands and is sympathetic to Plaintiff’s circumstances.
Plaintiff, like countless others, has suffered enormous loss as a result of the
COVID-19 pandemic, threatening not just Plaintiff’s livelihood, but the
continued vibrance and success of our local communities. Notwithstanding
this reality, however, the Court is not free to rewrite the terms of the Policy
and is obligated to enforce the terms thereof as written. 58

To be sure, courts have occasionally allowed such claims to survive a
motion to dismiss, reasoning that (1) the language requiring “direct physical
loss” is ambiguous and could encompass the COVID-related claims, (2) the
virus exclusion does not apply when the real cause of the harm is a
government shutdown order, or (3) a showing of actual contamination of the
premises could satisfy the “direct physical loss” requirement.59 Ultimately,
51. No. 21-11046, 2021 WL 3870697 (11th Cir. Aug. 31, 2021).
52. Id. at *2.
53. Id. (emphasis added).
54. 21 F.4th 704 (10th Cir. 2021), cert. denied, 142 S. Ct. 2779 (2022) (mem.).
55. Id. at 710.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 712–14; accord, e.g., SA Palm Beach, LLC v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s
London, 32 F.4th 1347, 1358–59 (11th Cir. 2022) (affirming rejection in putative class action
of business interruption insurance resulting from COVID-19); Uncork & Create LLC v.
Cincinnati Ins. Co., 27 F.4th 926, 930–34 (4th Cir. 2022) (same); Robert Levy, D.M.D., LLC
v. Hartford Cas. Ins. Co., No. 21-1446, 2022 WL 2520570, at *1 (8th Cir. July 7, 2022) (same).
58. J.G. Optical, Inc. v. Travelers Cos., No. 20-5744, 2021 WL 4260843, at *6 (D.N.J.
Sept. 20, 2021).
59. See, e.g., Elegant Massage, LLC v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 506 F. Supp. 3d
360, 376, 378 (E.D. Va. 2020) (finding the phrase “direct physical loss” to be ambiguous and
to potentially cover COVID-related claims, and further ruling that the virus exception did not
apply because a government shutdown was the direct cause of the loss); Blue Springs Dental
Care, LLC v. Owners Ins. Co., 488 F. Supp. 3d 867, 874 (W.D. Mo. 2020) (finding that
plaintiffs plausibly alleged that they were deprived of the use of their dental offices by the
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however, those decisions are outliers, and are unlikely to have continuing
vitality given the unanimous and well-reasoned federal appellate court
decisions to the contrary.
2. Rulings on Aggregation
a. Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation
Although the JPML has not considered many COVID-19 cases overall, it
has considered seven requests for centralization in business interruption
insurance cases and has denied such requests in five (roughly 70 percent) of
them.60 This percentage contrasts significantly with the JPML’s overall
recent rate of granting a majority of motions for centralization.61 Indeed,
despite the obvious efficiency of affording multidistrict litigation (MDL)
treatment when cases are spread throughout the country,62 in the business
interruption insurance cases, the JPML has rejected centralization except in
situations in which the scope of the cases was geographically narrow.63
The first case that the JPML considered was In re COVID-19 Business
Interruption Protection Insurance Litigation.64 In that case, the JPML was
asked to centralize fifteen cases pending in federal courts around the country
and asserting declaratory judgment and breach of contract claims against
providers of commercial property insurance.65 The JPML also received
notice of 263 related actions.66 In total, the claims spanned forty-eight
federal districts and involved collectively more than 100 insurers.67
Plaintiffs and the putative classes all claimed that the policies at issue
COVID-19 virus “physically attach[ing] itself” to their clinics (citing Studio 417, Inc. v.
Cincinnati Ins. Co., 478 F. Supp. 3d 794, 801–02 (W.D. Mo. 2020))); see also Shawn Rice,
The Biggest COVID-19 Business Interruption Rulings of 2021, LAW360 (Dec. 17, 2021, 2:54
PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/1436150/the-biggest-covid-19-business-interruptionrulings-of-2021 [https://perma.cc/F7W8-ZNQ6] (discussing state court rulings denying
motions to dismiss).
60. See infra notes 63–75 and accompanying text.
61. See U.S. JUD. PANEL ON MULTIDISTRICT LITIG., CALENDAR YEAR STATISTICS:
JANUARY THROUGH DECEMBER 2020, at 5 (2020), https://www.jpml.uscourts.gov/sites/
jpml/files/JPML_Calendar_Year_Statistics%202020.pdf
[https://perma.cc/42WY-358K]
(JPML granted twenty-one requests and denied nineteen in 2019, and granted twenty-six
requests and denied nineteen in 2020; in only four years between 2011 and 2020 did the JPML
deny more requests than it granted).
62. See, e.g., In re Volkswagen “Clean Diesel” Mktg., Sales Pracs. & Prods. Liab. Litig.,
148 F. Supp. 3d 1367, 1367 (J.P.M.L. 2015) (consolidating sixty-three actions from district
courts throughout the country in the Northern District of California, and noting that potentially
related actions had been filed in more than sixty different districts).
63. See, e.g., In re Soc’y Ins. Co. COVID-19 Bus. Interruption Prot. Ins. Litig., 492
F. Supp. 3d 1359, 1363 (J.P.M.L. 2020) (centralizing thirty-four pending actions against a
common insurer in the Northern District of Illinois because the forum “lies at the heart of [the
insurer’s] regional business and represents an accessible forum with the capacity to efficiently
manage these case”).
64. 482 F. Supp. 3d 1360 (J.P.M.L. 2020).
65. See id. at 1361.
66. See id.
67. See id.
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provided coverage for business losses caused by the COVID-19 pandemic.68
The JPML denied centralization, noting that “[t]here is no common
defendant in the[] actions,” and that the individual cases involved either a
single insurer or insurer-group, “i.e., related insurers operating under the
same umbrella or sharing ownership interests.”69 The JPML further noted
that “[m]anaging such a litigation would be an ambitious undertaking for any
jurist, and implementing a pretrial structure that yields efficiencies will take
time.”70 The time-consuming nature of an MDL was especially concerning
to the JPML because “[m]any plaintiffs [were] on the brink of bankruptcy as
a result of business loss due to the COVID-19 pandemic and the government
closure orders.”71 Thus, the JPML believed that individual litigation would
be the most expeditious approach, a puzzling conclusion given that it was the
plaintiffs who were requesting centralization.72 The JPML further declined
to create insurer-specific MDLs but held out such a possibility for future
cases.73
Rejecting centralization in cases involving multiple insurance companies
is understandable. Yet, following that initial ruling, the JPML has on four
separate occasions denied centralization of cases involving a single insurer.74
The JPML reasoned that separate handling of the cases by multiple judges
would achieve more rapid resolution. To be sure, in one group of cases, the
JPML did agree to centralize the business interruption insurance claims, but
it involved a relatively small geographical scope.75 Overall, the JPML has
not been in favor of centralizing business interruption insurance cases.
b. Class Certification Rulings
Because of the overwhelming success defendants have had in getting the
cases dismissed outright prior to rulings on class certification, there are
virtually no class certification opinions in this area.76 There is, however, an
interesting ruling by the Fourth Circuit in State Farm Mutual Auto Insurance
68. See id.
69. Id. at 1362.
70. Id. at 1363.
71. Id.
72. See id. at 1361.
73. See id. at 1364.
74. See In re Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s, London, COVID-19 Bus. Interruption Prot.
Ins. Litig., 492 F. Supp. 3d 1355, 1358 (J.P.M.L. 2020); In re Cincinnati Ins. Co. COVID-19
Bus. Interruption Prot. Ins. Litig., 492 F. Supp. 3d 1347, 1349–50 (J.P.M.L. 2020); In re
Hartford COVID-19 Bus. Interruption Prot. Ins. Litig., 493 F. Supp. 3d 1358, 1360–61
(J.P.M.L. 2020); In re Travelers COVID-19 Bus. Interruption Prot. Ins. Litig., 492 F. Supp.
3d 1341, 1343–44 (J.P.M.L. 2020).
75. See In re Soc’y Ins. Co. COVID-19 Bus. Interruption Prot. Ins. Litig., 492 F. Supp.
3d 1359, 1361 (J.P.M.L. 2020) (involving only six midwestern states). But see In re
COVID-19 Bus. Interruption Prot. Ins. Litig., 482 F. Supp. 3d 1360, 1361 (J.P.M.L. 2020)
(denying centralization after reviewing eleven actions in two districts and fifteen related
actions in twelve districts).
76. See, e.g., Chung v. Am. Zurich Ins. Co., No. 20-CV-5555, 2021 WL 6136206, at *6
(E.D.N.Y. Dec. 29, 2021) (holding that class claims had to be summarily dismissed after
individual claims were dismissed).
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Co. v. Elegant Massage, LLC.77 In that case, the district court, after
becoming one of the rare courts to deny a motion to dismiss a business
interruption insurance case stemming from COVID-19, went on to certify a
class action under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 (“Rule 23”) sua sponte
on the basis of commonality.78 Even if the district court, contrary to the great
weight of authority, thought that the business interruption insurance cases
were plausible on the merits, its approach of certifying a class before even
receiving plaintiffs’ motion for class certification merely underscored the
outlier quality of the case. Not surprisingly, on State Farm’s application for
interlocutory review under Rule 23(f), the Fourth Circuit summarily reversed
the grant of class certification.79 Although the Fourth Circuit “express[ed]
no opinion as to whether a Rule 23(b)(3) class is appropriate in th[e] case,”
it ruled that the district court may only exercise its discretion whether to grant
class certification “once it is asked to do so, and its discretion is bounded by
the requirements of Rule 23.”80 Given the district court’s strong desire to
certify a class, it is not surprising that, on remand—and after plaintiff
formally moved for class certification—the district court again certified a
Rule 23(b)(3) class.81
B. Tuition Refund Cases
Somewhere in the middle of the spectrum are numerous class actions that
have been filed by students against colleges and universities, seeking refunds
of tuition payments and fees on the grounds that the schools conducted
courses online, instead of in person, starting in the spring of 2020. But
moving to remote teaching was not unique conduct by a few colleges and
universities. More than 4,000 colleges and universities went to online
teaching because of the virus, and more than twenty-five million students
have been impacted.82 There can be no serious dispute that schools were
motivated by compelling health considerations, and in many instances by
direct government shutdown orders. Indeed, in colleges across the country,
the transition to online learning occurred in the middle of the spring semester
of 2020, when the risks of COVID-19 became clear. Were it not for
COVID-19, there can be little doubt that every school targeted in the tuition
reimbursement suits would have provided the same in-person instruction it
was providing prior to the pandemic.
77. No. 21-255, 2021 WL 4202678 (4th Cir. Sept. 2, 2021).
78. See Elegant Massage, LLC v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., No. 20-cv-265, 2021
WL 3686668, at *11 (E.D. Va. Aug. 19, 2021), rev’d and remanded, No. 21-255, 2021 WL
4202678 (4th Cir. Sept. 2, 2021).
79. See State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Elegant Massage, LLC, No. 21-255, 2021 WL
4202678, at *1 (4th Cir. Sept. 2, 2021).
80. Id.
81. See Elegant Massage, LLC v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., No. 20-cv-265, 2022
WL 433006, at *20 (E.D. Va. Feb. 11, 2022).
82. See Anjelica Cappellino, More Than 70 Universities Sued for Refunds Following
COVID-19 Campus Closures, EXPERT INST. (Apr. 27, 2022), https://www.expertinstitute.com/
resources/insights/universities-sued-for-covid-19-refunds-following-campus-closures/
[https://perma.cc/5SGM-YRXK].
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In reality, the colleges and universities were confronting a pandemic they
did not cause and were trying to provide education to students in the face of
serious health risks and government shutdowns. Indeed, these same
educational institutions have a duty to protect the collective health of their
students and may be held liable for any failure to do so.83 Schools not
infrequently dismiss students from class because of hurricanes, tornadoes,
floods, snowstorms, and all manner of events in which the capacity to instruct
safely is compromised. Online instruction was a solution necessitated by
COVID-19, not by any greed on the part of the schools.84 Indeed, most
schools returned to live teaching in the fall of 2021, even though the virus
continued to rage with the delta variant.85 Schools looking for an excuse to
continue online teaching for economic reasons could have cited continuing
COVID-19 risks (including the delta variant) and the need to protect students,
but they have not done so on a large scale.
Thus, these cases are not intuitively attractive. As one court noted, “suing
a university for adjusting to the COVID-19 pandemic to safeguard the health
of its students and faculty is not the most desirable case.”86 Unlike the
business interruption insurance cases, however, plaintiffs can allege a
commitment to in-person teaching based not only on the language of a
contract per se but also on a host of other marketing and course materials. If
the schools provided an unwavering commitment—by contract or through
course or marketing materials—to provide in-person teaching, regardless of
the circumstances, then such cases might have at least arguable merit.87 But,
as discussed below, in many of the tuition refund cases, plaintiffs cannot
point to any language whereby schools guaranteed in-person teaching.88

83. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 40 (AM.
L. INST. 2012) (listing “a school with its students” as a “special relationship” requiring “a duty
of reasonable care with regard to risks that arise within the scope of the relationship”).
84. See, e.g., Dougherty v. Drew Univ., 534 F. Supp. 3d 363, 376 (D.N.J. 2021) (“Because
the University’s decision [to go to online instruction in March 2020] was supported by public
health concerns and compliance with the law, it was fair and not arbitrary. The experience of
other institutions, commercial, educational, and judicial, suggests that Drew University was
not some sort of unreasonable outlier here . . . . I note the lack of any allegation that the
University possessed other, better options. For this reason, too, I lack a basis to fault the
University’s decision to pursue virtual learning.” (citation omitted)).
85. See Anne Dennon, Will Campuses Return to Normal in Fall 2021?, BEST COLLS. (May
6, 2022), https://web.archive.org/web/20210610060636/https://www.bestcolleges.com/blog/
college-campuses-covid-19-guidelines-fall/ (noting that schools were “racing” to return to inperson teaching). A number of institutions, however, temporarily returned to online
instruction in January 2022 because of the omicron variant. See, e.g., Joe Hernandez, Some
Colleges and Universities Will Start the New Year Online as Omicron Spreads, NPR (Dec.
22, 2021, 11:18 AM), https://www.npr.org/2021/12/22/1066788973/colleges-universitiesremote-distance-learning-omicron [https://perma.cc/LJ5Y-9VHD].
86. Rosado v. Barry Univ. Inc., No. 20-21813-CIV, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 169196,
at *23 (S.D. Fla. Sep. 7, 2021).
87. Plaintiffs in business interruption insurance cases, by contrast, are almost invariably
relegated to the plain language of the governing insurance policy because of integration
clauses. See supra Part I.A.1.
88. Plaintiffs’ arguments are stronger with respect to services that were not provided, such
as closing dorm rooms and cafeterias after students paid for those benefits for the entire
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Plaintiffs’ claims for tuition reimbursement are especially difficult to
maintain if based on tuition for the fall of 2020 (as opposed to the spring of
2020) if plaintiffs paid their tuition knowing that classes would continue to
be entirely online.89 At bottom, while not quite as challenging as the business
interruption insurance cases, the tuition reimbursement cases are nonetheless
difficult for plaintiffs.
Thus far, there have been no rulings by the JPML regarding centralization
of such claims. There have, however, been numerous decisions on motions
to dismiss, as well as a handful of decisions on class certification.
1. Rulings on Motions to Dismiss
Numerous courts have granted motions to dismiss in tuition
reimbursement cases. Not surprisingly, those courts have found no language
in either specific contracts or in marketing or course material promising
in-person instruction. Indeed, in some instances, the contracts explicitly
reserved to the schools the authority to modify programs and curriculums and
waived their liability for doing so.
For example, in Zagoria v. New York University,90 a plaintiff sued New
York University (NYU) on behalf of a putative class of students, raising
claims of breach of contract, unjust enrichment, and money had and
received.91 Plaintiff sought a refund of all tuition and fees paid as a result of
NYU’s decision to go to remote teaching in the spring of 2020 for all
courses.92 In dismissing the breach of contract claim, the district court
reasoned that there was no contractual provision guaranteeing in-person
instruction, and it found nothing in NYU’s marketing and recruitment
materials supporting such a guarantee.93 Moreover, the court found that
plaintiff’s argument was undermined by his “voluntary election to enroll in
online courses during the 2020 Summer session with the knowledge that
those courses would be conducted remotely.”94 The court also dismissed
plaintiff’s unjust enrichment claim, noting that unjust enrichment claims
cannot be brought when there is a valid, enforceable contract.95 That same
reasoning also compelled dismissal of the claim for money had and received,
which also does not apply when there is a contract covering the subject

semester, but the prospective recoveries are much less substantial than for tuition
reimbursement. See infra Part I.B.1.
89. Of course, even in the cases in which courts have denied motions to dismiss, surviving
summary judgment and trial is a whole different matter, given the implausibility that any
school would guarantee in-person teaching regardless of specific urgent circumstances that
might make it impracticable for a school to remain open.
90. No. 20-cv-3610, 2021 WL 1026511 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 17, 2021).
91. See id. at *1.
92. See id.
93. See id. at *4–5.
94. Id. at *5.
95. Id. (“Here, it is undisputed that the parties have a valid contract that governs the
relationship between NYU and its students.”).
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matter.96 As the court explained, “Plaintiff’s relationship with NYU is
contractual in nature, and the terms of the contract are well-established.”97
Similarly, in Michel v. Yale University,98 the court dismissed breach of
contract, unjust enrichment, and Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act99
claims brought by a Yale University student on behalf of a putative class
seeking tuition refunds because the university shifted from in-person to
online instruction in the spring of 2020.100 The court noted that Yale was not
alone in transitioning to online instruction: “[C]olleges and universities
across the country closed their doors in the middle of the Spring 2020
semester and migrated course instruction from in-person classrooms to
virtual ones,” and “[m]any of these institutions . . . chose not to refund any
portion of students’ tuition or fees.”101 In rejecting the breach of contract
claim, the court pointed to “Yale’s right [under the school’s undergraduate
regulations] to temporarily suspend—at its ‘discretion and judgment’—its
operations in response to emergencies.”102 As a result, “the exercise of that
authority cannot constitute a breach” of contract.103 Moreover, the regulation
“expressly commits the decision of whether to issue a refund to the
University’s discretion.”104 And in refusing to find that Yale’s decision not
to refund tuition was wrongful, the court said that it “cannot infer that Yale
acted with ‘dishonest purpose or moral obliquity’ simply because it exercised
its discretion in a manner that appears to be economically imbalanced to [the
plaintiff].”105 The court also rejected the plaintiff’s unjust enrichment and
Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices claims—the former because it
incorporated plaintiff’s flawed breach of contract claim, and the latter
because the plaintiff failed to allege any deceptive practice.106
Several other courts have similarly dismissed suits seeking tuition refunds
for remote teaching as a result of COVID-19.107 In some cases, courts have
relied on “reservation of rights” clauses that give colleges and universities
sole discretion to make changes to academic programs.108 Like in the above

96. See id. at *6.
97. Id.
98. 547 F. Supp. 3d 179 (D. Conn. 2021).
99. CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 42-110a to 42-110q (2022).
100. See id. at 182.
101. Id. at 185.
102. Id. at 190.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 190–91.
105. Id. at 191.
106. See id. at 192–94.
107. See, e.g., Barkhordar v. President & Fellows of Harvard Coll., 544 F. Supp. 3d 203,
212 (D. Mass. 2021) (“[E]ven assuming . . . that Harvard could reasonably expect that students
would understand from general promotional material that they had contracted for in-person
instruction and on-campus access during normal times, Spring 2020 was not a normal time.”);
Oyoque v. DePaul Univ., 520 F. Supp. 3d 1058, 1060–61 (N.D. Ill. 2021); Burt v. Bd. of Trs.
of Univ. of R.I., 523 F. Supp. 3d 214, 220–23 (D.R.I. 2021).
108. See, e.g., Dougherty v. Drew Univ., 534 F. Supp. 3d 363, 377 (D.N.J. 2021) (finding
that “[t]he transition to virtual education and accompanying campus closure represent a
change in the University’s academic program that falls within [the] reservation’s scope”).
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cases, plaintiffs could not identify binding commitments guaranteeing
in-person instruction either in individual contracts or in catalogs or other
promotional materials.109
The decisions are not unanimous, however. The U.S. Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia Circuit—the first circuit to consider COVID-related
tuition reimbursement cases—reversed in part a district court’s dismissal of
such claims against the George Washington University and American
University.110 In addition to allowing certain claims for fees to go forward,
the appellate court held that tuition claims for breach of implied contract and
unjust enrichment claims—but not breach of express contract claims—could
proceed.111 The appellate court relied heavily on “the fact that the
Universities themselves apparently charge different rates for online and
in-person instruction,”112 as well as on “numerous references to the benefits
of their on-campus instruction.”113 Importantly, the court—telegraphing its
own distaste for the claims—warned the plaintiffs that “the Universities will
likely have compelling arguments to offer that the pandemic and resulting
government shutdown orders discharged their duties to perform these alleged
promises.”114 Plaintiffs can hardly take comfort in the appellate court’s blunt
language.
In addition, in Gociman v. Loyola University of Chicago,115 the Seventh
Circuit, in a sharply divided opinion, reversed the district court and held that
a claim for tuition reimbursement could go forward based on a theory of an
implied contract premised on a course catalog, online registration portal, and
higher tuition for in-person than for online learning.116 The court also held
that an implied contract claim could proceed with respect to various fees paid
by students for certain services.117 Judge Amy J. St. Eve dissented, opining
that “[n]one of the written materials the students cite contain a specific
guarantee of in-person education or amenity access sufficient to maintain an
implied contract under Illinois law.”118
More recently, in King v. Baylor University,119 the Fifth Circuit reversed
the district court’s dismissal of a tuition reimbursement claim under a theory
of an express contract because the lower court failed to consider whether the
term “educational services” under Baylor’s financial responsibility
agreement (FRA) with students supported plaintiff, Baylor, or was
ambiguous (and if it was ambiguous, how it should be construed).120 The

109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.

See id. at 377–78.
See Shaffer v. George Washington Univ., 27 F.4th 754, 760–61 (D.C. Cir. 2022).
See id.
Id. at 765.
Id. at 764.
Id. at 760 (emphasis added).
No. 21-1304, 2022 WL 2913751 (7th Cir. July 25, 2022).
See id. at *5–8.
See id. at *7–8.
Id. at *12 (St. Eve, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
No. 21-50352, 2022 WL 3592114 (5th Cir. Aug. 23, 2022).
See id. at *1, *8–12.
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court dismissed the implied contract and unjust enrichment claims because
the FRA was a valid express contract covering the same subject matter.121
Several district courts have likewise refused to dismiss breach of contract
and unjust enrichment claims, finding it premature to hold whether students’
expectations of in-person instruction were unreasonable and unsupported.122
They too have focused on (1) the fact that the school in question normally
has both online and in-person instruction and charges less for the former, and
(2) various statements in the school’s marketing and course materials
implying that instruction will be in person.
For instance, in Metzner v. Quinnipiac University,123 the court denied a
motion to dismiss, emphasizing that “Quinnipiac charges students
significantly less for online degree programs”124 and that, in its marketing
and course materials, the school touted its “‘state-of-the-art facilities,’
‘outdoor spaces,’ ‘classroom and immersive experiential learning,’ and ‘the
beauty of New England.’”125 The court cautioned, however, that “discovery
may ultimately defeat Plaintiffs’ ability to demonstrate the existence of an
express or implied contract” based on marketing and course materials.126
Similarly, in Ford v. Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute,127 the court denied
a motion to dismiss in a COVID-related tuition refund suit, relying heavily
on the fact that “defendant’s publications describe a (mandatory) on-campus
learning experience that is integral to attending its school.”128 The court also
noted that the school “made some bold claims—or plausibly, promises—
about its in-person programming and hammered repeatedly on the benefits
of those programs in an assortment of circulars and even in its catalog.”129
Other cases with similar reasoning can be found.130 In addition, some courts

121. See id. at *12–15.
122. Plaintiffs, however, have been almost uniformly unsuccessful in alleging conversion.
Even courts allowing contract or unjust enrichment claims to go forward reason that a
conversion claim cannot succeed because it requires proof of dominion over personal property,
which cannot be satisfied given that the failure to provide in-person education is not property
and the tuition payments are not an isolated fund. See, e.g., Amable v. New Sch., 551 F. Supp.
3d 299, 305 (S.D.N.Y. 2021); Ford v. Rensselaer Polytechnic Inst., 507 F. Supp. 3d 406,
420–21 (N.D.N.Y. 2020). Similarly, claims based on “educational malpractice” have failed
because of the great deference afforded to colleges and universities in determining the precise
educational methods to utilize. See, e.g., Metzner v. Quinnipiac Univ., 528 F. Supp. 3d 15, 26
(D. Conn. 2021).
123. 528 F. Supp. 3d 15 (D. Conn. 2021).
124. Id. at 33.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 34.
127. 507 F. Supp. 3d 406 (N.D.N.Y. 2020).
128. Id. at 414.
129. Id. at 416.
130. See, e.g., In re Bos. Univ. COVID-19 Refund Litig., 511 F. Supp. 3d 20, 23–24
(D. Mass. 2021); Omori v. Brandeis Univ., 533 F. Supp. 3d 49, 56 (D. Mass. 2021) (relying
on the fact that the school charged less for online programs); see also King v. Baylor Univ.,
No. 21-50352, 2022 WL 3592114, at *16 (5th Cir. Aug. 23, 2022) (Duncan, J., concurring)
(stating that the plaintiff “alleges a straightforward breach-of-contract claim . . . . Many courts
around the country, faced with similar allegations, have refused to dismiss them”).
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have denied motions to dismiss with respect to fees, while dismissing the
more potentially lucrative claims for tuition reimbursement.131
Taken as a whole, COVID-related tuition reimbursement cases pose an
uphill battle for plaintiffs. Even courts that allow such cases to proceed
beyond the motion to dismiss stage caution that plaintiffs have a long road to
recovery (or, in the case of Gociman, face a strong dissent). And absent clear
evidence that the colleges and universities are reneging on actual promises to
provide in-person instruction, it is difficult to imagine many of these cases
surviving summary judgment and trial.
2. Class Certification Rulings
There have been few class certification rulings thus far in the tuition
reimbursement context, and they provide no basis, standing alone, for any
generalizations. One court granted class certification132 and another initially
denied class certification at the class certification stage because of
definitional issues but later certified a narrower class.133 A third rejected a
defendant’s aggressive efforts to circumvent a full-blown class certification
proceeding by moving to strike class allegations on the pleadings.134
In Cross v. University of Toledo,135 an Ohio state court granted
certification of three classes—a tuition class, a room-and-board class, and a
fee class—all relating to the spring 2020 semester.136 The court found that
the requirements of Ohio’s class action rule (which is similar to the federal
rule137) were all met.138 The court concluded that the question of whether
reimbursement of costs and fees was appropriate was the same for the class
as a whole, and that “[a] class action would achieve economies of time,
expense and effort, as well as promote a uniformity of decisions relative to
similarly situated persons.”139
In Little v. Grand Canyon University,140 the court initially denied class
certification, but did so solely because of concerns about the class definition,
rather than concerns about whether common issues were present.141 The
class was defined to “include persons who could not have been harmed by
131. See, e.g., Dougherty v. Drew Univ., 534 F. Supp. 3d 363, 383 (D.N.J. 2021) (noting
that, unlike tuition claims, claims for fees do not “go to the core of the university’s pedagogical
mission”).
132. See Cross v. Univ. of Toledo, No. 2020-00274JD, 2021 WL 1822676, at *6 (Ohio Ct.
Cl. Apr. 26, 2021).
133. See Little v. Grand Canyon Univ., No. CV-20-00795, 2021 WL 4263715, at *3
(D. Ariz. Sept. 20, 2021); Little v. Grand Canyon Univ., No. CV-20-00795, 2022 WL 266726,
at *4 (D. Ariz. Jan. 28, 2022).
134. Gibson v. Lynn Univ., Inc., No. 20-CIV-81173, 2021 WL 1109126, at *7 (S.D. Fla.
Mar. 23, 2021).
135. No. 2020-00274JD, 2021 WL 1822676 (Ohio Ct. Cl. Apr. 26, 2021).
136. See id. at *6.
137. See id. at *2.
138. See id. at *6.
139. Id.
140. No. CV-20-00795, 2021 WL 4263715 (D. Ariz. Sept. 20, 2021).
141. See id. at *3.
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Defendant’s allegedly unlawful conduct,” such as “employees, parents,
friends, relatives, or anyone else who potentially paid for tuition on behalf of
a student,” even though “[s]uch third parties, unlike students, have not
entered into contracts with [Grand Canyon University].”142 Such parties, the
court held, would lack standing to sue because they were not parties to the
contract.143 As a result, the class was “overbroad in that the definition
include[d] numerous individuals who lack[ed] standing to sue.”144 Four
months later, the court certified a more narrowly defined class that included
only students “enrolled in on-campus classes . . . for the Spring 2020
semester and who were charged and paid fees for services, facilities,
resources, activities, and/or events that were not provided.”145
In Gibson v. Lynn University, Inc.,146 the court rejected defendant’s motion
to strike the class action allegations.147 The court noted that it was rare to
reject a class action without considering a motion brought by plaintiff, and it
“disagree[d] [with defendant] that it would be impossible for Plaintiff’s
proposed class to satisfy the commonality and predominance
requirements.”148 The court noted that “it appears that questions concerning
what the operative contractual terms are between Lynn and its students may
be capable of class-wide proof” and that it was not “convinced that Plaintiff’s
contractual claims would necessarily require delving into the individual state
of mind of each student.”149 The court was “also unpersuaded that the
potential for individualized damages issues makes class certification
impossible in this case.”150 While plaintiff’s burden was minimal because of
the defendant’s aggressive strategy of trying to circumvent a full-blown class
certification proceeding, the court certainly suggests that there were
nonfrivolous arguments supporting class certification.151
Courts that have dismissed tuition reimbursement claims under Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) have had no occasion to address class
certification. Moreover, although the class certification decisions to date
yield few insights, courts that allow such cases to go forward beyond the
motion to dismiss stage will likely opt to certify class actions as well. Class
certification would seem to follow as a matter of course because presumably,
the contracts, marketing, and course materials are the same (or very similar)
for all or most class members. Indeed, the ruling in Gibson denying
defendant’s motion to strike class allegations followed the court’s ruling
from four months earlier, which denied defendant’s motion to dismiss.152
142. Id. at *2.
143. See id.
144. Id.
145. Little v. Grand Canyon Univ., No. CV-20-00795, 2022 WL 266726, at *4 (D. Ariz.
Jan. 28, 2022).
146. No. 20-CIV-81173, 2021 WL 1109126 (S.D. Fla. Mar. 23, 2021).
147. See id. at *7.
148. Id. at *4.
149. Id. at *5.
150. Id.
151. See id.
152. See Gibson v. Lynn Univ., Inc., 504 F. Supp. 3d 1335, 1337 (S.D. Fla. 2020).
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Although there might be some individualized issues if class members in a
particular case are relying on specific promises or representations made only
to them, the cases typically rely on widely disseminated marketing and
course materials or on a two-tiered pricing system for online and in-person
classes, and those facts are almost certainly the same for the class as a whole.
Thus, courts that are persuaded to deny motions to dismiss in tuition refund
cases are also highly likely to grant class certification.
C. Prison and Immigration Detention Cases
It is the duty of the “government to provide conditions of reasonable health
and safety to people in its custody.”153 Based on that duty, convicted people,
people detained pretrial, and detained immigrants have all filed putative class
action suits alleging that officials have failed to protect them from
COVID-19. For convicted people, the Eighth Amendment’s Cruel and
Unusual Punishment Clause applies to health risk claims.154 There are two
elements to such a claim: an objective component and a subjective
component.155 Under the objective component, an incarcerated person must
show “an objectively intolerable risk of harm.”156 The subjective component
requires a showing that the prison official acted with “deliberate
indifference.”157 For people detained prior to federal trial and raising health
risk claims, the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause applies,158 and for
people detained prior to state trial, the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process
Clause applies,159 but in all three scenarios, the same two-part
objective/subjective test is controlling.160 Moreover, health risk claims under
the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause, filed by those held in
immigration detention, are also governed “under the same rubric as Eighth
Amendment claims brought by prisoners.”161 Thus, it is not surprising that
the rulings in the prison context and those in the immigrant detention context
employ virtually identical reasoning.

153. Roman v. Wolf, 977 F.3d 935, 943 (9th Cir. 2020) (citing DeShaney v. Winnebago
Cnty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 199–200 (1989)); accord, e.g., Helling v. McKinney,
509 U.S. 25, 35 (1993) (holding that exposure to secondhand smoke can form the basis of an
imprisoned person’s Eighth Amendment claim against prison officials); Farmer v. Brennan,
511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994) (government is constitutionally required to “provide humane
conditions of confinement” and “must ‘take reasonable measures to guarantee the safety of
the inmates’” (quoting Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 526–27 (1984))).
154. See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 828.
155. See id. at 834.
156. Id. at 846.
157. Id. at 834; see also Helling, 509 U.S. at 29–30.
158. See Cuoco v. Moritsugu, 222 F.3d 99, 106 (2d Cir. 2000).
159. See id.
160. See id.; see also Fernandez-Rodriguez v. Licon-Vitale, 470 F. Supp. 3d 323, 348
(S.D.N.Y. 2020) (“The Eighth Amendment—for convicted prisoners—and the Fifth
Amendment—for pretrial detainees—govern the inmates’ claims of unconstitutionality . . . .
In either case, there is both an ‘objective’ and a ‘subjective’ prong to the analysis of whether
an inmate’s conditions of confinement are unconstitutional.”).
161. Villegas v. Metro. Gov’t of Nashville, 709 F.3d 563, 568 (6th Cir. 2013).
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With respect to the objective prong, courts generally agree “that infectious
diseases generally and COVID-19 specifically can pose a risk of serious and
fatal harm” to detained populations.162 Where courts are sharply divided is
whether the respective plaintiffs have made a sufficient showing of the
subjective element—deliberate indifference—to warrant preliminary or
permanent injunctive relief.163 To show deliberate indifference, plaintiffs
must show that the official “knows of and disregards an excessive risk to
inmate health or safety,”164 and this showing requires proof of a “state of
mind more blameworthy than negligence.”165 In many of the COVID-19
prison and immigration detention cases, courts have either addressed class
certification before deciding whether to issue an injunction,166 or they have
addressed class certification and preliminary injunctive relief in a single
order.167
This section first considers class certification issues in prison and
immigration detention cases. It then examines the judicial decisions
regarding the appropriateness of injunctive relief.
1. Class Certification
The court’s task at class certification is informed by well-established
authority. A case alleging mistreatment or unsafe conditions in a prison or
immigration detention facility is a “textbook example of a claim that belongs
in a class action.”168 Because class members seek solely injunctive relief, an
injunctive class under Rule 23(b)(2) is the appropriate type of class, as
opposed to the more exacting Rule 23(b)(3) class that is appropriate in suits
for damages.169 Although federal courts have become increasingly hostile to
class actions in the past two decades,170 that hostility is not evident in the
162. Smith v. DeWine, 476 F. Supp. 3d 635, 662 (S.D. Ohio 2020) (quoting Valentine v.
Collier, 956 F.3d 797, 801 (5th Cir. 2020)) (collecting cases).
163. See infra Part I.B.2.
164. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994).
165. Id. at 835.
166. See, e.g., Busby v. Bonner, 466 F. Supp. 3d 821, 834 (W.D. Tenn. 2020) (prison case);
Malam v. Adducci, 475 F. Supp. 3d 721, 744 (E.D. Mich. 2020) (immigration detention case).
167. See, e.g., Torres v. Milusnic, 472 F. Supp. 3d 713, 746 (C.D. Cal. 2020) (granting
class certification and preliminary injunction), enforced, No. CV 20-4450, 2021 WL 3829699
(C.D. Cal. Aug. 27, 2021); Maney v. Brown, 516 F. Supp. 3d 1161, 1185 (D. Or. 2021)
(ordering a preliminary injunction to give vaccines while granting class certification); Money
v. Pritzker, 453 F. Supp. 3d 1103, 1111 (N.D. Ill. 2020) (concluding that putative class failed
to show commonality and denying injunction for failure to show deliberate indifference).
168. See Ed Beeson, Top 15 High Court Class Action Rulings of the Past 15 Years, LAW360
(June 29, 2015, 4:14 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/671772 [https://perma.cc/59AHS8WF] (interview with Professor Samuel Issacharoff, in which he also describes Brown v.
Plata, 563 U.S. 493 (2011), a class action that successfully demonstrated prison overcrowding,
as “[t]he most significant class action case from [the Supreme Court]”).
169. See ROBERT H. KLONOFF, CLASS ACTIONS AND OTHER MULTI-PARTY LITIGATION IN A
NUTSHELL 118 (6th ed. 2021) (“[U]nlike Rule 23(b)(3) . . . , neither the text of Rule 23(b)(2)
nor the Advisory Committee Notes provide that common legal or factual questions among the
claimants must predominate over individual questions.”).
170. See generally Robert H. Klonoff, The Decline of Class Actions, 90 WASH. U. L. REV.
729 (2013).
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COVID-19 prison and immigration cases. Those cases involve situations in
which the alleged wrongdoing of the defendants is front and center, given
that their job is to protect a vulnerable population.
Courts that have addressed the issue have overwhelmingly granted class
certification in COVID-related prison cases. As the court noted in Ahlman
v. Barnes,171 “[f]ederal judges around the country have provisionally
certified similar classes of detainees bringing claims arising from the
COVID-19 pandemic.”172 In some cases, the defendants offered only weak,
pro forma objections.173
The four Rule 23(a) requirements are normally easy to satisfy. First,
numerosity under Rule 23(a)(1) is a given in these cases, which typically
involve hundreds or thousands of class members.174
Second, commonality under Rule 23(a)(2) is easily established, even after
the U.S. Supreme Court’s opinion in Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes,175
which raised the bar for showing commonality.176 For instance, in Valentine
v. Collier,177 the court noted that “all class members are subject to the
policies . . . that leave them at high risk of contracting COVID-19,”178 and
that “[s]ome form of coordinated emergency relief was necessary in order to
keep Plaintiffs and other [inmates] safe.”179 In Criswell v. Boudreaux,180 the
court found that the commonality requirement was satisfied because “all
members of the Proposed Class ‘are subject to the same practices and lack of
policies’ related to social distancing, testing, and legal visits,” and because
an overarching issue existed regarding “whether . . . defendant’s failure to
reduce overcrowding and to provide testing exposes class members to a
heightened risk of serious illness and death in violation of the Eighth and
Fourteenth Amendments.”181
171. 445 F. Supp. 3d 671 (C.D. Cal. 2020).
172. Id. at 684 (emphasis added) (collecting cases); accord, e.g., Criswell v. Boudreaux,
No. 20-cv-01048, 2020 WL 5235675, at *12 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 2, 2020) (“[S]everal district
courts have provisionally certified classes of detained and incarcerated individuals seeking
preliminary injunctive relief related to their conditions of confinement and detention during
the COVID-19 pandemic.”).
173. See, e.g., Malam v. Adducci, 475 F. Supp. 3d 721, 744 (E.D. Mich. 2020) (granting
class certification where defendant conceded a number of the requirements); Criswell, 2020
WL 5235675, at *15 (noting that “Defendant [did] not meaningfully oppose plaintiffs’
argument” for certifying a Rule 23(b)(2) class).
174. See, e.g., Maney v. Brown, 516 F. Supp. 3d 1161, 1173 (D. Or. 2021) (finding
numerosity based on a class of 10,400 members). Moreover, “where the relief sought is ‘only
injunctive or declaratory,’ the numerosity requirement is somewhat relaxed, and ‘even
speculative or conclusory allegations regarding numerosity’ are sufficient to permit
certification.” Fraihat v. U.S. Immigr. & Customs Enf’t, 445 F. Supp. 3d 709, 736–37 (C.D.
Cal. 2020) (quoting Sueoka v. United States, 101 F. App’x 649, 653 (9th Cir. 2004)), rev’d on
other grounds, 16 F.4th 613 (9th Cir. 2021).
175. 564 U.S. 338 (2011).
176. See Klonoff, supra note 170, at 774–76.
177. No. 20-CV-1115, 2020 WL 3491999 (S.D. Tex. June 27, 2020).
178. Id. at *9.
179. Id. at *6.
180. No. 20-cv-01048, 2020 WL 5235675 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 2, 2020).
181. Id. at *13.

408

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 91

Third, typicality under Rule 23(a)(3) is readily satisfied because the class
representatives are carefully selected by class counsel from the larger prison
population, and they normally do not raise any unique or atypical issues or
claims.182
Fourth, adequacy of representation under Rule 23(a)(4) is readily satisfied.
The class representatives in the prison cases have presented no concerns in
terms of their willingness and ability to advocate for the class, and they have
not had disabling conflicts of interest.183 Similarly, class counsel have easily
passed the adequacy threshold, with courts highlighting the class action
experience of class counsel.184
The requirements for establishing an injunctive class under Rule 23(b)(2)
have also been easily satisfied in prison cases. Courts have recognized that
the prison cases seek broad injunctive and declaratory relief—precisely what
Rule 23(b)(2) is designed to accomplish.185 As one court succinctly noted,
“[d]efendants’ actions and inaction apply to the class generally.”186
Courts in immigration detention cases have similarly had no difficulty
finding that the requirements of Rule 23(a) and Rule 23(b)(2) have been
met.187 They have found numerosity, typicality, and adequacy of
representation to be satisfied with little analysis.188 Likewise, courts have
had no difficulty identifying important common questions. For instance, in
Fraihat v. U.S. Immigration & Customs Enforcement,189 the court explained
that “the common question driving this case is whether Defendants’
system-wide response—or the lack of one—to COVID-19 violates Plaintiffs’
rights.”190 It noted that “[o]ne shared factual question is . . . what, if any,
nationwide measures ICE has taken in response to COVID-19 to protect the
health of vulnerable immigration detainees and whether those measures are
182. See, e.g., id. at *14; Maney v. Brown, 516 F. Supp. 3d 1161, 1176 (D. Or. 2021)
(“Both representatives are currently [adults in custody], are subject to substantial risk of
exposure to COVID-19, and challenge the same process regarding Defendants’ failure to
prioritize vaccine doses to [adults in custody].”); Busby v. Bonner, 466 F. Supp. 3d 821, 833
(W.D. Tenn. 2020) (also finding typicality satisfied).
183. See, e.g., Maney, 516 F. Supp. 3d at 1176; Busby, 466 F. Supp. 3d at 833; Torres v.
Milusnic, 472 F. Supp. 3d 713, 745 (C.D. Cal. 2020), enforced, No. CV 20-4450, 2021 WL
3829699 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 27, 2021).
184. See Maney, 516 F. Supp. 3d at 1176; Busby, 466 F. Supp. 3d at 833; Torres, 472
F. Supp. 3d at 745.
185. See Busby, 466 F. Supp. 3d at 833 (“Numerous courts have held that Rule 23(b)(2) is
an appropriate vehicle in actions challenging prison conditions.” (quoting Williams v. City of
Phila., 270 F.R.D. 208, 222 (E.D. Pa. 2010))).
186. Maney, 516 F. Supp. 3d at 1177.
187. See, e.g., Malam v. Adducci, 475 F. Supp. 3d 721, 744 (E.D. Mich. 2020) (granting
class certification to noncitizens in ICE custody); Savino v. Souza, 453 F. Supp. 3d 441,
449–53 (D. Mass. 2020) (same); Coreas v. Bounds, No. 20-0780, 2020 WL 5593338, at *14
(D. Md. Sept. 18, 2020) (same).
188. See, e.g., Fraihat v. U.S. Immigr. & Customs Enf’t, 445 F. Supp. 3d 709, 736–40
(C.D. Cal. 2020), rev’d on other grounds, 16 F.4th 613 (9th Cir. 2021); Gayle v. Meade,
No. 20-21553-Civ, 2020 WL 3041326, at *12–15 (S.D. Fla. June 6, 2020).
189. 445 F. Supp. 3d 709 (C.D. Cal. 2020), rev’d on other grounds, 16 F.4th 613 (9th Cir.
2021).
190. Id. at 737.
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legally sufficient. The existence, scope, and adequacy of those measures are
central to all of Plaintiffs’ claims.”191
In the rare cases in which Rule 23 issues have squarely reached the
appellate courts, those courts have upheld class certification, sometimes in
very conclusory rulings.192 For instance, in Roman v. Wolf,193 the Ninth
Circuit concluded in a single paragraph that the district court did not err in
certifying a class of those detained in the Adelanto Immigration and Customs
Enforcement Processing Center (“Adelanto”).194 According to the Ninth
Circuit, “[t]he alleged due process violations exposed all Adelanto detainees
to an unnecessary risk of harm, not only those who are uniquely vulnerable
to COVID-19 or who are not subject to mandatory detention.”195 Citing
Brown v. Plata,196 as well as Ninth Circuit authority, the court referenced
strong precedent upholding the suitability of class certification under Rule
23(b)(2) for constitutional attacks relating to health and safety issues in
prisons, such as “prison overcrowding.”197
To be sure, there are isolated cases denying class certification in prison
and immigration detention COVID-19 cases. For instance, in Money v.
Pritzker,198 the court found that commonality was lacking because any
decision on whether the vulnerable should be transferred or released “would
require ‘individualized safety assessments’ and ‘approve[d] home sites.’”199
In C.G.B. v. Wolf,200 the court denied class certification in a suit by a putative
class of transgender people seeking immediate release from immigration
detention facilities because of the risk of COVID-19, reasoning that class
members differed in age and medical conditions and were dispersed at
numerous detention facilities.201 And, in Thakker v. Doll,202 the court
declined to certify a class of those held in immigration detention centers
across central Pennsylvania because the class representatives and class
members “[we]re housed at different facilities,” were “subject to different
infection control procedures,” and “allege[d] a wide variety of medical
conditions that give rise to vastly differing COVID-19 risk profiles.”203
191. Id.
192. The only exceptions are cases in which the appellate court has overturned an
injunction. In that situation, the court has sometimes vacated the corresponding class
certification order. See, e.g., Fraihat v. U.S. Immigr. & Customs Enf’t, 16 F.4th 613, 618, 635
(9th Cir. 2021) (vacating class certification order not because of failure to satisfy Rule 23, but
because class certification was premised on the granting of a class-wide preliminary
injunction).
193. 977 F.3d 935 (9th Cir. 2020).
194. See id. at 944–45.
195. Id. at 944.
196. 563 U.S. 493 (2011).
197. Roman, 977 F.3d at 942.
198. 453 F. Supp. 3d 1103 (N.D. Ill. 2020).
199. Id. at 1127 (alteration in original) (quoting briefs).
200. 464 F. Supp. 3d 174 (D.D.C. 2020).
201. See id. at 203–06.
202. 336 F.R.D. 408 (M.D. Pa. 2020).
203. Id. at 416; see also, e.g., Wragg v. Ortiz, 462 F. Supp. 3d 476, 515 (D.N.J. 2020)
(denying class certification because “the Court would be required to engage in an intensive,
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2. Merits Rulings
As explained above, prisons and immigration detention facilities are
responsible for protecting the health and safety of their populations.204 Based
on the evidence, prison and immigration officials can clearly be upstream
wrongdoers, with COVID-19 merely providing context for the wrongdoing.
Not surprisingly, therefore, plaintiffs have been successful in securing
injunctive relief205 if they can show that the government officials were
deliberately indifferent to maintaining a safe environment.206 Yet, as
discussed below, even in prison and immigration detention cases, plaintiffs
have frequently failed to secure injunctive relief because some courts—
including a number of appellate courts—have determined that the officials
acted in good faith by taking specific steps to address the dangers imposed
by COVID-19. Courts have thus focused carefully on the law, without being
swayed by the enormity of COVID-19 or the aggregate nature of the claims.
As noted above, in both prison and immigration detention cases, the courts
have almost all found the objective component of relief to be satisfied
because “an inmate can face a substantial risk of serious harm in prison from
COVID-19 if a [facility] does not take adequate measures to counter the
spread of the virus.”207 Moreover, numerous courts have found the
subjective “deliberate indifference” test to be satisfied as well and have
accordingly ordered robust relief. For example, in Torres v. Milusnic,208 the
court—after certifying a class of people imprisoned at Lompoc federal prison
who were age fifty or over or suffering from specified underlying
conditions—determined that preliminary injunctive relief was warranted.209
The court found that officials at the Federal Correctional Institution, Lompoc,
“fail[ed] to take reasonable measures to promptly review and grant requests
multi-step, individualized inquiry as to whether each prisoner met criteria for conditional
release”).
204. See DeShaney v. Winnebago Cnty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 199–200
(1989).
205. In this context, unlike in the business interruption insurance and tuition refund cases,
the prison and immigration detention cases usually proceed directly to preliminary injunctive
relief, without prior motions to dismiss. It would be virtually impossible for a prison or
immigration detention facility to successfully argue that a COVID-related complaint should
be dismissed on the pleadings, given the extensive allegations that normally accompany such
complaints and the clear legal duty of the institutions to protect their populations.
206. See, e.g., Maney v. Brown, 516 F. Supp. 3d 1161, 1182 (D. Or. 2021) (granting
injunctive relief because the plaintiffs “[were] likely to establish that [the prison officials were]
acting with deliberate indifference by failing to offer the COVID-19 vaccine to AICs [(adults
in custody)] at the same time they offer[ed]” it to prison employees).
207. Chunn v. Edge, 465 F. Supp. 3d 168, 200 (E.D.N.Y. 2020); accord, e.g.,
Fernandez-Rodriguez v. Licon-Vitale, 470 F. Supp. 3d 323, 351 (S.D.N.Y. 2020) (“Many
courts have found that prisons exposed to the novel coronavirus present conditions that meet
the objective prong of the constitutional analysis.” (collecting cases)); Smith v. DeWine, 476
F. Supp. 3d 635, 662 (S.D. Ohio 2020) (“This Court agrees with the other district courts across
the country who have found COVID-19 to be an objectively intolerable risk of harm to
prisoners when it enters a prison.” (collecting cases)).
208. 472 F. Supp. 3d 713 (C.D. Cal. 2020), enforced, No. CV 20-4450, 2021 WL 3829699
(C.D. Cal. Aug. 27, 2021).
209. See id. at 746–47.
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for compassionate release or move for compassionate release on behalf of
Lompoc inmates to reduce the inmate population,” and that this failure to act
“demonstrate[d the prison’s] deliberate indifference to inmates’ risk of
severe illness or death from COVID-19.”210 The court ordered broad
preliminary injunctive relief, including requiring the facility to determine
eligibility for home confinement and adopting criteria for compassionate
release.211 Similarly, in Martinez-Brooks v. Easter,212 the court held that
officials at the Federal Correctional Institution, Danbury, “acted with
deliberate indifference to the risk posed by COVID-19” by “fail[ing] to
transfer medically vulnerable prisoners from . . . Danbury to home
confinement ‘in any meaningful numbers.’”213
Numerous district courts have granted wide-ranging injunctive relief in
immigration detention cases, as they did with the prison cases. For instance,
in Gayle v. Meade,214 the district court’s preliminary injunction included
numerous requirements, such as:
• “providing [the class representatives] and the class members with
unrestricted access to hand soap, hand sanitizer, and disposable
hand towels”;
• “[p]rovid[ing] cleaning supplies for each housing area,” including
“CDC-recommended disinfectants in sufficient quantities to
facilitate frequent cleaning”;
• “provid[ing] new gloves and masks for each inmate” when “they
are cleaning or performing janitorial services”;
• “[p]rovid[ing] all inmates and staff members with masks” and
education on their proper use;
• increasing the frequency of “cleaning and disinfecting of all
common areas and surfaces”;
• “[l]imit[ing] transportation of detainees to only instances
regarding immediately necessary medical appointments and
release from custody”;
• and providing education and posting signage regarding ways to
protect against COVID-19.215
210. Id. at 740.
211. See id. at 746–47.
212. 459 F. Supp. 3d 411 (D. Conn. 2020).
213. Id. at 441; accord, e.g., Torres, 472 F. Supp. 3d at 740; Cameron v. Bouchard, 462
F. Supp. 3d 746, 778–79 (E.D. Mich.) (given the “medically-vulnerable population’s unique,
specific, and life-threatening susceptibility to COVID-19—paired with the communal nature
of jail facilities, the Court finds that home confinement or early release is the only reasonable
response”), vacated, 815 F. App’x 978 (6th Cir. 2020).
214. No. 20-21553-Civ, 2020 WL 3041326 (S.D. Fla. June 6, 2020).
215. Id. at *23; accord, e.g., Ahlman v. Barnes, 445 F. Supp. 3d 671, 694 (C.D. Cal. 2020)
(granting injunction requiring compliance with CDC guidelines for social distancing and
sanitary practices while denying request for release); Maney v. Brown, 516 F. Supp. 3d 1161,
1185 (D. Or. 2021) (ordering “that Defendants shall offer all AICs [(adults in custody)] . . .
a COVID-19 vaccine”); Chatman v. Otani, No. CV 21-00268, 2021 WL 2941990, at *24
(D. Haw. July 13, 2021) (requiring greater intake screening, social distancing measures, and
sanitary living conditions).
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In some instances, federal appellate courts have upheld preliminary
injunction orders issued by district courts. For example, in Roman v. Wolf,216
a putative class action was brought on behalf of 1,370 people detained at
Adelanto, alleging that they were placed at grave risk of contracting
COVID-19.217 After certifying a class, the district court issued a preliminary
injunction requiring numerous safety measures to address COVID-related
risks, including sanitation measures and social distancing.218 The Ninth
Circuit held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in ordering
preliminary injunctive relief, given the district court’s detailed factual
findings—which identified a lack of quarantining, unsanitary conditions, and
a lack of social distancing—that the government did not challenge as clearly
erroneous.219 The appellate court found that Adelanto’s “inadequate
response reflected a reckless disregard for detainee safety.”220
Similarly, in Zepeda Rivas v. Jennings,221 those detained at Mesa Verde
Detention Facility and Yuba County Jail filed a class action challenging the
conditions in both facilities.222 The district court granted preliminary
injunctive relief, concluding that plaintiffs showed a likelihood of success as
of the time the court’s temporary restraining order was entered.223 On appeal,
the Ninth Circuit affirmed.224 It cited the district court’s finding that
“COVID-19 posed grave health risks,” making the facilities “a ‘tinderbox’
for COVID-19 transmission,” and it highlighted the district court’s
conclusion that the facility had taken only “modest measures in response to
the pandemic,” even though “COVID-19 posed a serious health-risk to all
detainees—not only those in high-risk categories.”225
On the other hand, a number of district courts have found—based on the
efforts of prison and immigration detention officials to address COVID-19—
that plaintiffs likely could not establish deliberate indifference. The
following quotes exemplify the approaches of those courts:
The evidence shows that [prison] officials have been acting urgently to
prevent COVID-19 from spreading and from causing harm. They have
imposed dozens of measures . . . . [And they] are “trying, very hard, to

216. 977 F.3d 935 (9th Cir. 2020) (per curiam).
217. See id. at 939.
218. See id.
219. See id. at 942.
220. Id. at 943. The Ninth Circuit did, however, vacate parts of the district court’s order
requiring specific measures tailored to conditions at Adelanto in April 2020. See id. at 945.
The court indicated that the government was taking specific steps to address COVID-19 risks,
including testing all people detained at Adelanto for COVID-19, and that the injunction thus
“no longer reflect[ed] the current realities at Adelanto.” Id.
221. 845 F. App’x 530 (9th Cir. 2021) (per curiam).
222. See id. at 532.
223. See id. at 533.
224. See id. at 534.
225. Id.
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protect inmates against the virus and to treat those who have contracted
it” . . . .226
There is no dispute . . . that Defendants have enacted various policies in
response to the risks posed by COVID-19 . . . . The very fact that
Defendants have enacted such policies supports that they have not been
subjectively indifferent to the risks posed by COVID-19 to
Plaintiffs . . . .227
[T]he warden has implemented a number of policy changes . . . . [These
changes] show that the prison’s good faith efforts to improve its response—
even if it was initially deficient . . . —is enough to demonstrate that a
petitioner is unlikely to succeed in showing deliberate indifference.228

Even when a district court makes extensive findings supporting deliberate
indifference, such findings do not ensure success on appeal. Several federal
appellate courts faced with such findings have reversed district court
injunctions in both prison and immigration detention cases.229 In each case,
the rationale for reversal has been the same: contrary to the district court’s
findings, the evidence showed that the prisons were indeed making
substantial efforts to protect the safety of the incarcerated, which belied a
claim that they were deliberately indifferent to health and safety concerns.230
In some instances, the appellate decisions have provoked vigorous dissents
that attempt to refute the notion that the officials were genuinely taking
adequate and effective measures to combat COVID-19 in their
institutions.231 These appellate decisions are thorough and are worth
examining in some detail.
In Wilson v. Williams,232 incarcerated people at the Federal Correctional
Institution, Elkton, sought a preliminary injunction to reduce the population
and allow for proper social distancing.233 The district court agreed, noting
that “Elkton has altogether failed to separate its inmates at least six feet apart,
despite clear [Centers for Disease Control and Prevention] guidance.”234 The
Sixth Circuit reversed, noting that “while the harm imposed by COVID-19
on inmates at Elkton ‘ultimately [is] not averted,’ the [Bureau of Prisons] has
‘responded reasonably to the risk’ and therefore has not been deliberately

226. Chunn v. Edge, 465 F. Supp. 3d 168, 202–03 (E.D.N.Y. 2020) (quoting Money v.
Pritzker, 453 F. Supp. 3d 1103, 1132 (N.D. Ill. 2020)).
227. Lucero-Gonzalez v. Kline, 464 F. Supp. 3d 1078, 1090 (D. Ariz. 2020).
228. Fernandez-Rodriguez v. Licon-Vitale, 470 F. Supp. 3d 323, 353–54 (S.D.N.Y. 2020);
accord, e.g., Plata v. Newsom, 445 F. Supp. 3d 557, 564 (N.D. Cal. 2020) (noting numerous
measures to protect the health of the imprisoned); Alcantara v. Archambeault, 462 F. Supp.
3d 1073, 1076–77 (S.D. Cal. 2020) (noting steps to protect health of those detained in
immigration centers).
229. See infra notes 232–83 and accompanying text.
230. See infra notes 232–83 and accompanying text.
231. See infra notes 232–83 and accompanying text.
232. 455 F. Supp. 3d 467 (N.D. Ohio), vacated, 961 F.3d 829 (6th Cir. 2020).
233. See id. at 470.
234. Id. at 479. The Elkton facility expected to receive only twenty-five tests a week,
despite imprisoning 2,400 people. Id. at 471.
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indifferent to the inmates’ Eighth Amendment rights.”235
R. Guy Cole, Jr., dissented, reasoning that
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Chief Judge

the BOP’s failure to make use of its home confinement authority at Elkton,
even as it stared down the escalating spread of the virus and a shortage of
testing capacity, constitutes sufficient evidence for the district court to have
found that petitioners were likely to succeed on their Eighth Amendment
claim.236

Soon thereafter, the Sixth Circuit reversed another preliminary injunction
order. In Cameron v. Bouchard,237 five people incarcerated at Michigan’s
Oakland County Jail brought a putative class action claiming that the jail was
deliberately indifferent to the risks posed by COVID-19.238 The district court
agreed that plaintiffs were likely to succeed in showing deliberate
indifference and ordered the facility to adopt a myriad of protective
measures.239 On appeal, the Sixth Circuit reversed.240 It held that plaintiffs
could not satisfy the deliberate indifference standard because “the steps that
jail officials took to prevent the spread of COVID-19 were reasonable.”241
The court described those steps in great detail: the jail officials circulated a
mailing to staff about proper cleaning procedures, halted all visitation,
quarantined new arrestees for fourteen days, quarantined anyone with
COVID-19 symptoms, offered masks and medical treatment, canceled group
activities, provided a disinfectant that works against COVID-19, provided
COVID-19 testing access, and took on several other measures.242 The court
again found that such steps showed that plaintiffs were unlikely to succeed
on the merits.243 Chief Judge Cole again dissented, reasoning that the
majority had improperly reviewed factual findings by the district court,
which included specific incidents in which imprisoned people were exposed
to serious safety risks.244 As one example, Chief Judge Cole noted evidence
that officials altered their practices solely for an inspection of the jail, only
to return to unsafe practices when the inspection concluded.245 He also noted
that the jail “deployed transfers to COVID-infected areas punitively, . . .
repeatedly provided inadequate medical care, failed to consistently

235. Wilson v. Williams, 961 F.3d 829, 841 (6th Cir. 2020) (first alteration in original)
(quoting Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 844 (1994)).
236. Id. at 847 (Cole, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
237. 462 F. Supp. 3d 746 (E.D. Mich.), vacated, 815 F. App’x 978 (6th Cir. 2020).
238. See id. at 753.
239. See id.
240. See Cameron v. Bouchard, 815 F. App’x 978, 983 (6th Cir. 2020).
241. Id. at 985.
242. See id.
243. See id. at 988. The court noted that the facts were similar to those in Wilson, in which
the Sixth Circuit vacated a preliminary injunction that had required various steps to protect
imprisoned people from COVID-19, finding that the steps taken by the prison showed that
plaintiffs were not likely to succeed on the merits. See id. at 985–86 (discussing Wilson v.
Williams, 961 F.3d 829 (6th Cir. 2020)). It rejected plaintiffs’ arguments in Cameron
attempting to distinguish Wilson. See id. at 986–88.
244. Id. at 990 (Cole, C.J., dissenting).
245. Id. at 991.
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quarantine symptomatic inmates, and did not take advantage of opportunities
for increased social distancing.”246
In Valentine v. Collier,247 a putative class action was brought by
incarcerated people against the Wallace Pack Unit, a state geriatric prison run
by the Texas Department of Criminal Justice and comprised of people over
age sixty-five and others with significant health issues.248 The complaint
alleged, inter alia, that the prison—in violation of the Eighth Amendment—
failed to provide hand sanitizer and disposable paper towels, did not enforce
social distancing, and failed to provide incarcerated people working as
janitors with clean masks and gloves.249 The district court granted a
preliminary injunction.250 Two days later, the Fifth Circuit unanimously
stayed the preliminary injunction pending appeal.251 The Fifth Circuit
concluded that “the evidence shows that [the Texas Department of Criminal
Justice] has taken and continues to take measures—informed by guidance
from the CDC and medical professionals—to abate and control the spread of
the virus.”252 Plaintiffs thereafter applied to the Supreme Court to vacate the
Fifth Circuit’s stay, but the Court denied the application without comment.253
Justice Sonia M. Sotomayor, writing for herself and Justice Ruth Bader
Ginsburg, filed a “statement” (not a dissent) “to highlight the disturbing
allegations presented below”—including the dramatic increase in the number
of imprisoned people testing positive for COVID-19—and to note their
expectation that “courts will be vigilant in protecting the constitutional rights
of those like applicants.”254
The district court subsequently granted class certification255 and thereafter
conducted an eighteen-day bench trial on plaintiffs’ request for a permanent
class-wide injunction.256 After the trial, the district court issued lengthy
findings detailing the continued safety issues at the prison and held that a
permanent injunction was warranted.257 Again, the Fifth Circuit rejected the
district court’s analysis, this time overturning the permanent injunction.258 It
determined that the prison had in fact taken numerous important steps to
protect the incarcerated, and it noted that “this litigation generally and the
district court’s careful management and expedited handling of the case

246. Id. at 994.
247. 455 F. Supp. 3d 308 (S.D. Tex. 2020).
248. Id. at 311.
249. See id. at 314–19.
250. See id. at 330.
251. See Valentine v. Collier, 956 F.3d 797, 799 (5th Cir. 2020).
252. Id. at 802.
253. See Valentine v. Collier, 140 S. Ct. 1598 (2020).
254. Id. at 1598, 1601 (statement of Justice Sotomayor, joined by Justice Ginsburg).
255. Valentine v. Collier, No. 20-CV-1115, 2020 WL 3491999, at *1 (S.D. Tex. June 27,
2020).
256. See Valentine v. Collier, 490 F. Supp. 3d 1121, 1128 (S.D. Tex. 2020), rev’d, 993
F.3d 270 (5th Cir. 2021).
257. See id. at 1174–75.
258. Valentine v. Collier, 993 F.3d 270, 277 (5th Cir. 2021).
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played a role in motivating the prison officials into action and saved countless
lives.”259
In Swain v. Junior,260 a class of medically vulnerable people incarcerated
at Miami’s Metro West Detention Center challenged the conditions there and
alleged that prison officials displayed deliberate indifference by not
practicing social distancing when feasible and by failing to provide adequate
cleaning or personal sanitation supplies.261 The district court granted a
preliminary injunction, finding that the rate of COVID-19 infections in the
prison had increased significantly, and that social distancing was not
occurring.262 It ordered numerous measures, including (among others) social
distancing to the extent feasible and ensuring that “all inmates have access to
testing, protective masks, cleaning and hygiene supplies, and adequate
medical care.”263 In a split decision, the Eleventh Circuit reversed.264
Quoting testimony by an expert commissioned by the district court, the
majority noted that prison officials “should be commended for their
commitment to protect the staff and the inmates.”265 At bottom, the court
“simply [could not] conclude that, when faced with a perfect storm of a
contagious virus and the space constraints inherent in a correctional facility,
the defendants here acted unreasonably by ‘doing their best.’”266 Judge
Beverly B. Martin dissented, arguing that the “repeated failures to enact
adequate social distancing measures documented in these declarations
[submitted by plaintiffs] are sufficient to demonstrate a systemic,
institutional pattern of deliberate indifference.”267
In Mays v. Dart,268 a class of people detained at Cook County Jail—
presently or in the future—sued the Cook County sheriff, claiming that the
facility failed to provide them with “reasonably safe living conditions as the
pandemic rage[d].”269 In granting a preliminary injunction, the district court
mandated procedures to ensure social distancing throughout the prison.270
The prison had opposed the motion, arguing that it had “taken substantial
steps to implement social distancing, and that further steps were
impossible.”271 The district court focused solely on social distancing and did
not address the prison’s other responses to COVID-19.272 The Seventh
Circuit unanimously reversed.273 It found that the district court “erred by

259.
260.
261.
262.
263.
264.
265.
266.
267.
268.
269.
270.
271.
272.
273.

Id. at 289.
961 F.3d 1276 (11th Cir. 2020).
Id. at 1280–81.
See id. at 1283.
Id. at 1284.
Id. at 1280.
Id. at 1288 (quoting expert report).
Id. at 1289.
Id. at 1301 (Martin, J., dissenting).
974 F.3d 810 (7th Cir. 2020), cert. denied, 142 S. Ct. 69 (2021) (mem.).
Id. at 813.
See id.
Id. at 817.
See id.
See id. at 814.
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narrowly focusing . . . almost exclusively on social distancing instead of
considering the totality of facts and circumstances, including all of the
Sheriff’s conduct in responding to and managing COVID-19.”274 It noted
that such “substantial efforts” included “opening shuttered divisions of the
Jail, creating new single-cell housing, and decreasing the capacity of
dormitories,” as well as “extensive other measures to prevent and manage the
spread of COVID-19 at the Jail.”275
Finally, in Fraihat v. U.S. Immigration & Customs Enforcement,276
plaintiffs filed a putative class action challenging deliberate indifference to
medical needs at the approximately 250 U.S. Immigration and Customs
Enforcement (ICE) facilities nationwide.277 After certifying two nationwide
subclasses involving detained individuals with heightened risk factors, the
district court issued a preliminary injunction mandating numerous
COVID-related measures, including tracking those with risk factors, making
prompt custody determinations for those with risk factors, and implementing
a comprehensive performance standard covering COVID-related issues.278
In a lengthy split decision, the Ninth Circuit reversed.279 The court noted
that “ICE in the spring of 2020 (and earlier) took steps to address
COVID-19.”280 In particular, ICE “provided a detailed set of directives on a
host of topics relevant to mitigating the risks of COVID-19.”281 Moreover,
while the district court cited specific problems in individual detention
centers, “the circumstances at individual detention facilities could not justify
the broad, nationwide relief that plaintiffs pursued.”282 Judge Marsha S.
Berzon dissented, arguing that “ICE did little to carry out the broad,
deferential directives issued in April [2020], and the coronavirus spread
exponentially among the medically vulnerable members of the Plaintiff
subclasses.”283
Taken as a whole, these district court and appellate court decisions in both
the prison and immigration detention settings reveal judges struggling with
whether officials had taken sufficient steps to reduce the risks of COVID-19
at their facilities. District judges, hearing the evidence firsthand, have in
many cases agreed with the need for injunctive relief, although plaintiffs have
not been universally successful. At the appellate level, however, the courts
give far more deference to prison and immigration detention officials, finding
that their efforts are made in good faith in the face of an ever-changing and
274. Id. at 819.
275. Id. at 820. The court did, however, affirm portions of the district court’s order
embodied in an earlier temporary restraining order issued by the district court relating to
“sanitation, testing, and providing facemasks,” noting that those requirements did not raise the
same safety issues as mandating social distancing. Id. at 824.
276. 16 F.4th 613 (9th Cir. 2021).
277. See id. at 618.
278. See id.
279. See id. at 619.
280. Id. at 637.
281. Id.
282. Id. at 645.
283. Id. at 656 (Berzon, J., dissenting).
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challenging pandemic. One can credibly argue that the appellate courts fail
to give sufficient deference to the findings of the district courts, but one thing
is certain: the focus of both the district courts and the appellate courts is on
whether the defendants were deliberately indifferent to the health risks in
their institutions, or instead were doing their best to address the serious health
concerns. Moreover, the appellate decisions, like those in the district courts,
are exhaustive, with extensive citation to, and analysis of, the trial records.
In the end, the point on which all of the judges in these cases agree is that the
focus must be on whether the facilities—through their own action and
inaction—have been deliberately indifferent to the health risks of
COVID-19.
II. OTHER EXAMPLES OF THE IMPORTANCE OF FOCUSING ON THE
DEFENDANT’S CONDUCT
In many of the categories of COVID-related cases, there have been few
decisions either on the merits or at the class certification stage. Nonetheless,
based on the few rulings that have been rendered, and a review of various
complaints that have been filed, it is possible to reflect on the likelihood that
various other types of cases will be successful. I focus here on consumer,
labor, and securities fraud cases.
A. Consumer Claims
Numerous cases have been filed by consumers alleging that defendants
have unfairly sought to profit from COVID-19. For example, in Garner v.
Global Plasma Solutions Inc.,284 a plaintiff filed a putative class action
alleging that the defendant falsely touted its air ionizer product as “a proven
tool in the fight against COVID-19”285 and falsely claimed that “the ionizers
could filter COVID out of the air and disinfect surfaces.”286 The court denied
the defendant Global Plasma’s motion to dismiss, finding that the plaintiff
had properly alleged material misrepresentations.287 For instance, Global
Plasma described certain favorable tests as “independent” when the tests
were actually funded by the company.288 In addition, two studies
contradicted the company’s claim that the ionizers were in fact effective in
filtering COVID-19 out of the air and in disinfecting surfaces.289 The court
noted that, during a crisis, “some people scramble to make a quick buck,”
and that “[t]he COVID-19 pandemic is no different.”290
By contrast, courts have refused to allow consumers to bring claims of
deceptive advertising tied to COVID-19 when the product label contained

284.
285.
286.
287.
288.
289.
290.

No. 21-cv-00665, 2022 WL 742488 (D. Del. Mar. 10, 2022).
Id. at *5 (quoting complaint).
Id.
See id. at *6.
Id. at *4.
See id. at *5.
Id. at *1.
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clear warnings about the product’s limitations. In Gudgel v. Clorox Co.,291
the court dismissed putative class claims alleging that Clorox’s packaging
and marketing were misleading consumers to believe that one of its bleach
products was “suitable for disinfecting” during the pandemic when, in fact,
it was not.292 The court relied on the fact that the label in question explicitly
warned that the product was “not for sanitization or disinfection” and
contained no misleading words or images that would lead a “reasonable
consumer” to believe otherwise.293
In Ranalli v. Etsy.com, LLC,294 consumers brought claims under the
Pennsylvania Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Law,295 as
well as common-law claims of unjust enrichment, fraud, and conversion
against online distributors of face masks.296 Before the pandemic, the sale
of nonmedical face masks at issue were subject to sales tax because the masks
were classified as “ornamental wear . . . and the use for which consumers
purchased nonmedical masks . . . was not for an exempt purpose.”297 In
response to the pandemic, the governor of Pennsylvania declared a state of
emergency, which allowed for an exemption to paying sales tax on purchases
of “medical supplies and/or clothing and accessories.”298 According to
plaintiffs, defendants failed to comply with the governor’s mandate and
charged plaintiffs sales tax on their purchases of face masks. 299 The court
granted the distributors’ motion to dismiss all claims with prejudice, based
on its finding that “[i]t is clear that collection of the sales taxes was not for
profit or revenue.”300 The court emphasized that the tax could not have been
appropriated for defendants’ use because, “once [plaintiff] paid the sales tax,
regardless of whether the tax was imposed correctly, it became the property
of the Commonwealth.”301
The need to focus on the defendant’s precise conduct is also illustrated by
the competing arguments in Greenberg v. Amazon.com, Inc.,302 in which a
motion to dismiss by Amazon is pending as of the time of writing.303 In
Greenberg, customers of the online marketplace brought a putative class
action alleging negligence, unjust enrichment, and price gouging in violation

291. 514 F. Supp. 3d 1177 (N.D. Cal. 2021).
292. Id. at 1182.
293. Id. at 1186.
294. 570 F. Supp. 3d 301 (W.D. Pa. 2021).
295. 73 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 201-1 to 201-10 (West 2022).
296. See Ranalli, 570 F. Supp. 3d at 303–04.
297. Id. at 304 (quoting guidance from the Pennsylvania Department of Revenue).
298. Id. (quoting complaint).
299. See id.
300. Id. at 309 (emphasis added).
301. Id. at 308.
302. No. 21-cv-00898 (W.D. Wash. filed July 2, 2021).
303. See Motion of Defendant Amazon.com, Inc. to Dismiss Plaintiffs’ First Amended
Complaint Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), Greenberg v. Amazon.com, Inc., No.
21-cv-00898 (W.D. Wash. Dec. 3, 2021), ECF No. 22.
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of the Washington’s Consumer Protection Act.304 Specifically, plaintiffs
identified price increases ranging from 233 percent to 1,800 percent on
specific products supplied by both Amazon and third-party vendors that were
in high demand due to the pandemic.305 Amazon allegedly “jacked prices on
its own inventory of products to profiteer off consumers in desperate
need.”306 Amazon filed a motion to dismiss arguing, among other things,
that judicial interference with free-market functions, especially in times of
emergency, fail to consider the difficulty that retailers and suppliers faced in
“obtaining raw materials or labor to create the products in highest
demand.”307 The success of this litigation will depend on the court’s
assessment of whether Amazon used COVID-19 to reap unconscionable
profits or was simply responding in good faith to overwhelming consumer
demand and passing along price increases that Amazon itself incurred.
B. Labor Cases
One COVID-19 litigation tracker indicates that, as of April 2022, there
were “5,659 lawsuits (including 646 class actions) filed against employers
due to alleged labor and employment violations related to the
coronavirus.”308 Statistics alone, however, are of limited value; overall
numbers belie the wide range of COVID-related labor cases, with some
alleging serious wrongdoing by employers, but with others involving
employers acting reasonably to protect the health of staff and customers.
Plaintiffs raising allegations of direct wrongdoing by defendants include
those alleging race discrimination, such as claims that hospitals gave African
Americans dangerous assignments—e.g., cleaning COVID-19 patients’
rooms—while white employees received less dangerous assignments.309 If
304. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 19.86.010–19.86.920 (West 2022); see First Amended
Class Action Complaint at 1, 61–66, Greenberg v. Amazon.com, Inc., No. 21-cv-00898 (W.D.
Wash. Oct. 22, 2021), ECF No. 19.
305. First Amended Class Action Complaint, supra note 304, at 2. The complaint alleged
the following price increases:
• Face Masks: Increases up to 1,800 percent, from $4.21 to $79.99;
• Cold Remedies: Increases up to 1,523 percent, from $4.65 to $79.00;
• Toilet Paper: Increases up to 1,044 percent, from $17.48 to $200;
• Pain Reliever: Increases up to 233 percent, from $18.75 to $62.40;
• Black Beans: Increases up to 521 percent, from $3.54 to $21.99;
• Baking Soda: Increases of more than 1,500 percent, from $3.08 to $50.00;
• Flour: Increases up to 400 percent, from $22.00 to $110.00;
• Yeast: Increases up to 625 percent, from $7.02 to $50.95; and
• Disinfectant Wipes: Increases of more than 745 percent, from $20.71 to $174.96.
Id. (emphasis omitted).
306. Id. at 3.
307. Motion of Defendant Amazon.com, Inc. to Dismiss Plaintiffs’ First Amended
Complaint Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), supra note 303, at 8.
308. LITTLER MENDELSON, supra note 4.
309. See Hayward v. Cath. Health Sys., No. 21-cv-01033 (W.D.N.Y. filed Sept. 17, 2021);
Patrick Lakamp, Workers Allege Racial Discrimination in Lawsuit Against Mercy Hospital,
BUFFALO NEWS (Aug. 24, 2021), https://buffalonews.com/news/local/workers-allege-racialdiscrimination-in-lawsuit-against-mercy-hospital/article_40d57136-0504-11ec-9bead335200f90b2.html [https://perma.cc/VN4U-Q6TS].
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these kinds of allegations can be supported with precise factual allegations
(for motions to dismiss) and evidence (for summary judgment), they
represent serious misconduct on the part of the defendant, with COVID-19
serving as the particular context of such wrongdoing.
On the other hand, cases can be identified in which the alleged labor
violations are simply reasonable attempts to maintain health and safety. For
example, in Bridges v. Houston Methodist Hospital,310 plaintiffs—116
hospital employees—complained that, with certain exceptions, they would
be terminated if they did not receive a COVID-19 vaccination.311 In granting
defendant’s motion to dismiss, the court noted that defendant was not a
wrongdoer but was instead trying to protect the safety of patients and staff:
“Methodist is trying to do their business of saving lives without giving them
the COVID-19 virus. It is a choice made to keep staff, patients, and their
families safer.”312 The court emphasized that “Bridges [the lead plaintiff]
can freely choose to accept or refuse a COVID-19 vaccine; however, if she
refuses, she will simply need to work somewhere else.”313
C. Securities Fraud Cases
In securities fraud suits, courts are likely to hold that statements early in
the pandemic about expected positive earnings or the likely limited financial
impact of the pandemic cannot be deemed fraudulent because the company
could not have anticipated the scope or magnitude of the pandemic.314 On
the other hand, cases alleging false statements about a company’s progress
in developing a vaccine or about the ability of a company’s drugs to cure
COVID-19, as opposed to mere optimistic predictions about the possibility
of such breakthroughs, are likely to survive motions to dismiss.315
For example, in In re Carnival Corp. Securities Litigation,316 a class of
investors alleged that a cruise line downplayed the risks of COVID-19 and
falsely advertised “full compliance with . . . all U.S. and international safety
regulations,” and that this materially misled investors regarding the potential
impact that COVID-19 would have on the company’s financial health.317
Despite Carnival’s claim of having “protocols, standards and practices for
every possible issue you might imagine, including coronavirus,”318 plaintiffs
310. 543 F. Supp. 3d 525 (S.D. Tex. 2021), aff’d sub nom. Bridges v. Methodist Hosp.,
No. 21-20311, 2022 WL 2116213 (5th Cir. June 13, 2022).
311. See id. at 526.
312. Id. at 528.
313. Id.
314. See, e.g., Berg v. Velocity Fin., Inc., No. 20-cv-06780, 2021 WL 268250, at *10 (C.D.
Cal. Jan. 25, 2021) (stating company could not have anticipated in January 2020 “the extent
of the coronavirus pandemic, or even the presence of the disease in America, at the time of
[the company’s initial public offering]”).
315. See, e.g., McDermid v. Inovio Pharms., Inc., 520 F. Supp. 3d 652, 662–65 (E.D. Pa.
2021) (finding sufficient allegations that company misled investors about the progress of a
vaccine).
316. No. 20-cv-22202, 2021 WL 2583113 (S.D. Fla. May 28, 2021).
317. Id. at *6.
318. Id. at *8.
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alleged that the COVID-19 outbreaks on the defendant’s ships revealed that
Carnival actually “lacked proper policies, procedures, controls, or processes”
to effectively keep its passengers safe.319 Among other things, the cruise line
allegedly failed to conduct pre-boarding screening or only required
passengers to sign a form stating that they were not sick before boarding.320
The court found that none of Carnival’s statements rose to the level of
materially false or misleading because the statements could not be
“objectively measured in the face of a rapidly evolving global pandemic.”321
According to the court, many of the statements challenged were goals that
were not actually false, and in a number of instances the health protocols
requested by the plaintiffs exceeded what the CDC recommended at the
time.322 The court also noted that “hindsight knowledge [about passengers
becoming sick on Carnival cruises] cannot be used to assert securities
fraud.”323 Subsequently, a second amended complaint was filed and
dismissed with prejudice.324
By contrast, in McDermid v. Inovio Pharmaceuticals, Inc.,325 the court
denied a motion to dismiss the plaintiffs’ claims that the company’s CEO and
CFO misled investors about the company’s progress toward developing a
COVID-19 vaccine, thereby inflating the company’s stock price.326 The
primary statements leading to the suit were made during two nationally
televised interviews with the CEO, who claimed that “within three hours of
accessing [COVID-19’s genetic sequence] . . . we were able to construct our
vaccine,”327 and that the company had “fully construct[ed] [its COVID-19]
vaccine within three hours.”328 After each of the two interviews, the second
being with then President Donald Trump, the company’s stock price
increased 7.5 percent and 69.7 percent, respectively.329 While the price was
inflated, both the CEO and the CFO sold portions of their company stock for
the first time in nearly two years.330 The court held that the issue of whether
these statements were misleading to investors—given that the company had
only designed a vaccine without actually constructing it—was an issue “of
fact inappropriate for resolution at the motion to dismiss stage of the
litigation.”331

319. Id. at *2.
320. See id. at *3–4.
321. Id. at *12.
322. See id. at *15 (emphasis added).
323. Id. at *13.
324. See In re Carnival Corp. Sec. Litig., No. 20-cv-22202, 2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 58526,
at *80 (S.D. Fla. Mar. 30, 2022).
325. 520 F. Supp. 3d 652 (E.D. Pa. 2021).
326. See id. at 657–58.
327. Id. at 658 (alterations in original) (quoting amended complaint).
328. Id. (alterations in original) (quoting amended complaint).
329. See id.
330. See id. at 660.
331. Id. at 662.
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III. OTHER IMPORTANT TRENDS IN COVID-19 CASES
Part III of this Essay focuses on two other important trends in
COVID-related cases: (1) courts’ rigorous enforcement of arbitration clauses
and class action waivers and (2) the paucity of COVID-related class-wide
settlements, given the thousands of class actions filed in the wake of
COVID-19.
A. Arbitration Clauses
The Supreme Court, in several cases, has made it very difficult for
plaintiffs to circumvent arbitration clauses or class action waivers.332
Outside of the COVID-19 context, courts have not considered defendants’
alleged wrongdoing when determining whether the case should be submitted
to arbitration.333 The sole issue is whether the parties in fact contracted for
arbitration or a waiver of class actions in the event of a dispute.
Not surprisingly, courts have uniformly followed this approach in the
COVID-19 context. Courts have enforced class action waivers and
arbitration clauses in numerous COVID-related cases involving cruise line
and airline contracts,334 tickets to canceled entertainment events,335 hosts
complaining that Airbnb canceled bookings,336 gyms that were forced to
close,337 and even disputes regarding benefits under the Coronavirus Aid,
Relief, and Economic Security Act338 (CARES Act).339 Although some
courts have denied motions to compel arbitration in COVID-related cases,

332. See generally AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333 (2011) (enforcing
arbitration clause that barred class-wide litigation and class-wide arbitration); Am. Express
Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 570 U.S. 228 (2013) (enforcing agreement requiring individual
arbitration despite argument that such a result would prevent aggrieved parties from
vindicating rights under federal antitrust laws). See also Klonoff, supra note 170, at 815–23
(discussing case law on arbitration clauses and class action waivers).
333. See, e.g., Selden v. Airbnb, Inc., 4 F.4th 148, 152 (D.C. Cir. 2021) (affirming lower
court’s submitting to arbitration allegations that company allowed property owners to
discriminate on the basis of race in violation of the Civil Rights Act); Gilbert v. Indeed, Inc.,
513 F. Supp. 3d 374, 382–83 (S.D.N.Y. 2021) (granting employer’s motion to compel
arbitration after finding valid arbitration provisions in employment and incentives contracts
despite allegations that employee was sexually harassed, assaulted, raped, and then fired for
medical conditions resulting from the trauma).
334. See, e.g., Lindsay v. Carnival Corp., No. C20-982, 2021 WL 2682566, at *4 (W.D.
Wash. June 30, 2021); Saperstein v. Thomas P. Gohagan & Co., 476 F. Supp. 3d 965, 967
(N.D. Cal. 2020).
335. See, e.g., Snow v. Eventbrite, Inc., No. 20-cv-03698, 2021 WL 3931995, at *1 (N.D.
Cal. Sept. 2, 2021); Ajzenman v. Off. of Comm’r of Baseball, 492 F. Supp. 3d 1067, 1071
(C.D. Cal. 2020).
336. See, e.g., Farmer v. Airbnb, Inc., No. 20-cv-07842, 2021 WL 4942675, at *1 (N.D.
Cal. June 1, 2021).
337. See, e.g., Williams v. Planet Fitness, Inc., No. 20-CV-3335, 2021 WL 1165101, at *1
(N.D. Ill. Mar. 26, 2021).
338. Pub. L. No. 116-136, 134 Stat. 281 (2020) (codified as amended in scattered sections
of the U.S.C.).
339. See, e.g., Marselian v. Wells Fargo & Co., 514 F. Supp. 3d 1166, 1170 (N.D. Cal.
2021).
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those cases apply settled law without noting any considerations unique to the
pandemic.340
For example, in Saperstein v. Thomas P. Gohagan & Co.,341 following
cancellations in response to the pandemic, a cruise line offered its customers
two refund options: (1) transfer the reservation and money paid to a similar
travel program in 2021 or 2022 or (2) receive travel vouchers for other
Gohagan travel programs operating through 2022.342 Consumers, who were
seeking a full refund of monies paid, brought a putative class action alleging
intentional misrepresentation, unjust enrichment, and violation of
California’s Unfair Competition Law.343
Plaintiffs challenged, on
unconscionability grounds, the validity of the arbitration provision included
in the cruise reservation, claiming that there was no opportunity for
meaningful negotiation of the terms and that the contract therefore lacked
mutuality.344 The court held that the parties entered into a valid agreement
to arbitrate “issues of arbitrability, which encompasse[d] the dispute of
whether the broader arbitration provision is unconscionable.”345
Similarly, in Marselian v. Wells Fargo & Co.,346 a putative class action
was brought against Wells Fargo for its processing of Paycheck Protection
Program loans for businesses under the CARES Act.347 The bank allegedly
prioritized processing loans for larger businesses that required higher loan
amounts as a way of maximizing commissions.348 Plaintiffs alleged that
“[a]s a result of Wells Fargo’s unfair business practices . . . thousands of
small businesses . . . did not receive the critical loan proceeds they needed
while most at risk.”349 The court found that plaintiff had assented to the
terms of an application form that contained an arbitration agreement, and thus
granted defendant’s motion to compel arbitration.350
These cases, and others like them, reveal that many putative class actions
relating to COVID-19 may be nonstarters because of enforceable arbitration
agreements and class action waiver clauses.
B. Willingness of Some Defendants to Reach Prompt
Class-Wide Settlements
With thousands of COVID-related class actions pending throughout the
country, one might have expected to see a significant number of class-wide
settlements by defendants fearful of exposing themselves to massive
340. See, e.g., In re StubHub Refund Litig., No. 20-md-02951, 2021 WL 5447006, at
*7–8 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 22, 2021).
341. 476 F. Supp. 3d 965 (N.D. Cal. 2020).
342. See id. at 969.
343. CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE §§ 17200–17210 (West 2022); see Saperstein, 476 F. Supp.
3d at 967.
344. See id. at 970–71.
345. Id. at 976–77.
346. 514 F. Supp. 3d 1166 (N.D. Cal. 2021).
347. See id. at 1170.
348. See id.
349. Id. (first and second alterations in original) (quoting complaint).
350. See id. at 1173, 1177.
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class-wide judgments—or simply wanting to foster goodwill among repeat
customers. Thus far, class settlements have been rare, and they have virtually
always followed defendants’ defeat either on the merits (denial of motions to
dismiss) or through the grant of a preliminary injunction.
As an example of the handful of class-wide settlements, Barry University
reached a class-wide settlement in a tuition reimbursement case.351 After
losing on its motion to dismiss,352 Barry University agreed to create a $2.4
million common fund for the benefit of students, covering various fees
including tuition fees, room and board fees, health fees, and lab and material
fees.353 Under the settlement, class members will receive “approximately
60% of their anticipated recoverable damages.”354 In addition to the
problems of surviving summary judgment and winning at trial, plaintiffs
faced the fact that the Florida legislature had specifically adopted legislation
denouncing the tuition reimbursement cases as “without legal precedent.”355
As the court noted, this legislation “may have precluded relief altogether.”356
Columbia University similarly reached a settlement of a putative class
action seeking reimbursement for tuition and fees.357 The district court had
previously granted in part and denied in part Columbia’s motion to dismiss,
allowing claims for fees to go forward but not those for tuition
reimbursement.358 Under a proposed settlement, Columbia would establish
a fund with $12,500,000 that, after payment of attorneys’ fees, would be used
to reimburse students the amount of student fees that had been paid for the
portion of the spring semester that was conducted remotely.359 Because the
settlement is limited to the recovery of student fees, it is a far cry from the
expansive class action suit that was originally brought, which sought not only
fees but also the reimbursement of the much higher tuition costs.360
In the context of claims seeking reimbursement for canceled flights,
Deutsche Lufthansa AG and a class of passengers settled a case in which the
class sought refunds for flights canceled as a result of COVID-19.361 The

351. See Rosado v. Barry Univ. Inc., No. 20-21813-CIV, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 169196,
at *1–3 (S.D. Fla. Sep. 7, 2021).
352. See Rosado v. Barry Univ. Inc., 499 F. Supp. 3d 1152, 1154 (S.D. Fla. 2021).
353. See Rosado, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 169196, at *6–7.
354. Id. at *6.
355. Id. at *15 (quoting FLA. STAT. § 768.39(1) (2021)).
356. Id. at *17. But see Ferretti v. Nova Se. Univ., Inc., No. 20-CIV-61431, 2022 WL
471213, at *8 (S.D. Fla. Feb. 16, 2022) (holding that “retroactive application of the [Florida]
[s]tatute would violate due process by impairing Plaintiff’s vested rights in his causes of
action”).
357. See Stipulation of Settlement, In re Columbia University Tuition Refund Action,
No. 20-cv-03208 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 23, 2021), ECF No. 86-1.
358. See In re Columbia Tuition Refund Action, 523 F. Supp. 3d 414, 419–20 (S.D.N.Y.
2021).
359. See Stipulation of Settlement, supra note 357, at 12–13, 24.
360. See In re Columbia Tuition Refund Action, 523 F. Supp. 3d at 420.
361. See Plaintiffs’ Notice of Motion and Motion for Preliminary Approval of Class Action
Settlement, Provisional Certification of Nationwide Settlement Classes, and Approval of
Procedure for and Form of Notice at 1, Maree v. Deutsche Lufthansa AG, No. 20-cv-00885
(C.D. Cal. Aug. 16, 2021), ECF No. 95.
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case had previously survived a motion to dismiss (on plaintiffs’ second
attempt).362 In their motion for preliminary approval of the proposed
settlement class, plaintiffs noted that numerous airline refund cases had failed
to survive a motion to dismiss, and that others that had survived dismissal
had nonetheless been voluntarily dismissed.363 The motion further noted
that, while there were some other airline refund cases that had survived a
motion to dismiss, the Lufthansa case was the only one known to class
counsel to have resulted in a settlement.364
A rare example of a class-wide settlement of a COVID-related labor
dispute is Benson v. Enterprise Leasing Co. of Orlando.365 The settlement
resolved a class action challenging Enterprise’s decision to lay off 964
employees with less than sixty days’ notice, allegedly in violation of the
Worker Adjustment and Retraining Notification Act366 (WARN Act).367
Enterprise had lost in the district court despite asserting that the requirements
of the WARN Act did not apply because COVID-19 qualified as a “natural
disaster.”368 The settlement is a meager one—it creates a $175,000 fund that,
after subtracting administrative fees and litigation costs (estimated to be
around $23,000–$24,000), will be divided among all of the 964 class
members who submit claims.369
In the prison and immigration detention context, there have been some
settlements as well. For instance, in Chatman v. Otani,370 a federal judge in
Hawaii entered an order granting final approval to a class settlement in a suit
by people incarcerated in Hawaii alleging that the state’s prisons had failed
to protect them from COVID-19.371 Four months earlier, the court had issued
a lengthy opinion certifying a class action and entering a preliminary
injunction, after finding that state officials showed deliberate indifference to
the health of the prison population.372 The settlement provides for
“[i]mplementation of the Response Plan, with adaptations based on CDC
guidelines, best practices and recommendations from the State of Hawai’i
Department of Health,”373 as well as a five-person monitoring panel
362. See Maree v. Deutsche Lufthansa AG, No. SACV 20-885, 2021 WL 267853, at *1
(C.D. Cal. Jan. 26, 2021).
363. See Plaintiffs’ Notice of Motion and Motion for Preliminary Approval of Class Action
Settlement, Provisional Certification of Nationwide Settlement Classes, and Approval of
Procedure for and Form of Notice, supra note 361, at 2–3.
364. See id. at 3–4.
365. No. 20-cv-891 (M.D. Fla. filed May 25, 2020).
366. 29 U.S.C. §§ 2101–2109.
367. See Plaintiff’s Unopposed Motion for Preliminary Approval of Class Action
Settlement at 4, 14–15, Benson v. Enter. Leasing Co. of Orlando, No. 20-cv-891 (M.D. Fla.
Nov. 29, 2021), ECF No. 130.
368. Benson v. Enter. Leasing Co. of Orlando, No. 20-cv-891, 2021 WL 1078410, at *5
(M.D. Fla. Feb. 4, 2021).
369. See Plaintiff’s Unopposed Motion for Preliminary Approval of Class Action
Settlement, supra note 367, at 5–7.
370. No. 21-00268, 2021 WL 5238762 (D. Haw. Nov. 10, 2021).
371. See id. at *1.
372. See Chatman v. Otani, No. 21-00268, 2021 WL 2941990 (D. Haw. July 13, 2021).
373. Chatman, 2021 WL 5238762, at *1.
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responsible for “provid[ing] non-binding, informed guidance and
recommendations to aid [the Department of Public Safety (DPS)] with the
implementation of the Response Plan and any necessary changes to DPS’s
COVID-19 response.”374
Likewise, in Gayle v. Meade,375 immigrants in three south Florida ICE
detention centers reached an agreement with the United States to address
COVID-related concerns.376 The settlement requires ICE to comply with
various population requirements, CDC guidelines, and ICE’s pandemic
response requirements, and provides for judicial oversight to ensure such
compliance.377 Again, the settlement mirrored prior rulings that granted
class certification and ordered preliminary injunctive relief.378
The paucity of class settlements to date may be due in part to the slowdown
of COVID-19 litigation and the absence of pressure from an upcoming trial
date. Nonetheless, it also appears that defendants are not in any hurry to
settle the cases and are content, at least for now, to defend them vigorously.
That strategy is understandable, given the cautious approach that courts have
taken in COVID-related cases, and the myriad of victories that defendants
have achieved thus far.
CONCLUSION
Instead of providing a sympathetic backdrop for plaintiffs, COVID-19 has
served as a source of caution for courts adjudicating COVID-related cases.
The myriad of adverse rulings in COVID-19 cases are striking. Courts
understand that defendants did not cause the pandemic and should be liable
only when their own contractual breach or misconduct is clear. Even in some
cases alleging serious misconduct, arbitration clauses and class action
waivers will frequently serve as a roadblock to aggregating cases that are not
worth pursuing individually. And few defendants have felt compelled to
enter into early class-wide settlements. In short, while the flurry of
COVID-related class actions initially raised the prospect of a litigation crisis
akin to the explosion of asbestos cases, the courts have not been swayed by
374. Id. at *2.
375. No. 20-21553-civ, 2021 WL 6101368 (S.D. Fla. Dec. 3, 2021), report and
recommendation adopted, No. 20-21553-civ, 2021 WL 6072820 (S.D. Fla. Dec. 23, 2021).
376. See id. at *1.
377. See id. at *5–7.
378. See Gayle v. Meade, No. 20-21553-civ, 2020 WL 3041326, at *23–24 (S.D. Fla. June
6, 2020). For other examples of settlements in COVID-19 prison and immigration detention
cases, see Joseph P. Smith, Cumberland, Jail Inmates Reach Settlement in Federal Court Case
over COVID-19, DAILY J. (May 6, 2021, 5:34 PM), https://www.thedailyjournal.com/story/
news/2021/05/06/nj-federal-lawsuit-inmates-cumberland-county-jail-brown-warren-judgehillman/4972080001/ [https://perma.cc/CG4T-MRUN]; WIRAC Class Action Reaches
Settlement in Landmark COVID-19 Case for Immigrants, YALE L. SCH. (Apr. 6, 2021),
https://law.yale.edu/yls-today/news/wirac-class-action-reaches-settlement-landmark-covid19-case-immigrants [https://perma.cc/5ZEV-34AR]; Noelle E.C. Evans, NYCLU Reaches
Settlement with ICE over COVID-19 Protections at Batavia Detention Center, WXXI NEWS
(Aug. 4, 2020, 4:10 PM), https://www.wxxinews.org/coronavirus/2020-08-04/nyclu-reachessettlement-with-ice-over-covid-19-protections-at-batavia-detention-center
[https://perma.cc/V3VA-Z9XV].
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the enormity of COVID-19 or the large number of claims. Instead, they have
commendably focused on the merits of the cases and have not hesitated to
deny relief when such relief is not clearly justified.

